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PROGRESS AND JUSTIFICATION
IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW
John T. Parry*
I am delighted and honored to join this celebration of the work of one of our most
eminent legal historians, Lawrence Friedman. My contribution begins by considering
aspects of Friedman's criminal law scholarship, with particular attention to his massive
and magisterial Crime and Punishment in American History ("Crime and Punishment"). 
1
I want to say a little bit at a very general level about Friedman's achievement in Crime
and Punishment and some of his other writings on criminal law before developing more
pointed observations that grew out of, and were inspired by, my readings of his work. At
times, my essay takes a highly speculative, perhaps even polemical tone. I hope readers
will agree with me that one of the sincerest ways to honor a scholar's work is not simply
to describe or celebrate it but rather to use and engage with it.
I. NARRATING THE HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
Friedman's focus in his writings on crime is emphatically not on criminal law in its
past or contemporary doctrinal intricacy, although he explores that intricacy at many
points. Nor does he concentrate on the history of doctrine and the ways litigants,
lawyers, and judges manipulate it, although he pays attention to all that.2 Rather, he
presents a social history of criminal justice policies and practices in the United States and
shows particular concern for interpreting crime rates in the United States--especially
rates of violent crime-and the societal and governmental responses to those rates. The
results are consistently both sweeping and detailed-a broad perspective grounded in a
complex array of facts. He also pays serious attention to comparative material,
* Visiting Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School; Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of
Law. Thanks to Paul Finkelman for inviting me to participate in this symposium. I am grateful for the
questions and comments of other participants, in particular Lawrence Friedman, Pnina Lahav, and Jason
Mazzone; for the thoughts and comments of Vivian Curran, Seth Kreimer, Marty Lederman, Erik Luna, Ruth
Miller, and Sean O'Connor; and for the financial assistance of a Dean's Summer Scholarship Grant from the
University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1. Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History (Basic Bks. 1993).
2. See e.g. Lawrence M. Friedman, Taking Law and Society Seriously, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 529, 529
(1999) (arguing "law is a political, economic, and cultural subsystem, which varies with, and is determined by,
the surrounding society," with the result that legal argument has little social importance); Friedman, supra n. 1,
at 447 ("[T]he criminal justice system cannot compete with the culture, cannot go against the grain. In the
battle of norms and goals, it is distinctly marginal; more than a spear-carrier, but very much less than a star.");
see also infra n. 43.
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particularly on comparative crime rates-material that tends to show the United States in
a negative, or at least not admirable, light.
3
Friedman's scholarship is provocative in the best sense of the word. From the law
and society and social history perspectives, he challenges lawyers to think outside of
doctrine and consider other forces that may have a more powerful impact on criminal
law and practice. Similarly, he challenges policymakers to think outside of partisan
politics and easy targets. More generally, he challenges readers from all perspectives to
think about history not as a source of consensus truths or easy lessons, but as a more
complex and fluid source of information, instruction, and concern.
One of the most admirable aspects of Friedman's immense body of work is that he
does not practice what I call "this I believe" scholarship-that is, the statement of a
vision (sometimes called a theory) about what law or society ought to look like with no
concern for what legal and social conditions actually are (except to note that they do not
measure up) and with no remotely plausible way of achieving the desired goal beyond
simply the assertion that right-thinking people ought to share the vision. I do not mean
to say that there are no politics in Friedman's work. He clearly cares about the political
implications of his work. Neither can the fact that Friedman does history explain his
aversion to the "this I believe" school. Many historians spend their careers spinning
utopic or dystopic fantasies about the past and its relation to the present. What makes
Friedman's work different is that he is grounded in his examination of social conditions,
in something that we might want to call "reality" or facts (perhaps not even with
quotation marks). And rather than provide reassuring or alarming tales, he leaves us
with as many questions as answers, because, I suspect, he knows full well that framing
and exploring the questions and recognizing nuance-not simply puffing out answers-
is more often the serious work of the scholar.
4
In that spirit, I want to explore some questions that arose from my reading of
Friedman's work on criminal law. In particular, I would like to engage with him on two
issues-one implicit in his work and the other far more explicit. The first is the idea of
justification, and what it means for a rational, liberal, and progressive conception of
3. Lawrence M. Friedman, American Law in the Twentieth Century 205 (Yale U. Press 2002) [hereinafter
Friedman, Twentieth Century]; Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Remarks on Crime, Violence, History, and
Culture, 69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1121, 1122-23 (1998) [hereinafter Friedman, Some Remarks]; Lawrence M.
Friedman, Dead Hands: Past and Present in Criminal Justice Policy, 27 Cumb. L. Rev. 903, 916-17, 920
(1997) [hereinafter Friedman, Dead Hands]; Lawrence M. Friedman & George Fisher, Some Thoughts About
Crime and Punishment, in The Crime Conundrum: Essays on Criminal Justice 1-2, 10 (Lawrence M. Friedman
& George Fisher eds., Westview Press 1997) [hereinafter The Crime Conundrum]; Friedman, supra n. 1, at
451. I wonder, however, whether the stark contrast between a violent United States and other, more peaceful,
developed countries can be overstated. Japan, for example, may not have the same murder rates as the United
States, but it is hardly free of pervasive, organized, violent crime as well as systematic state coercion and
violence. See Kenneth Szymkowiak & Patricia G. Steinhoff, Wrapping Up in Something Long: Intimidation
and Violence by Right-Wing Groups in Postwar Japan, 7 Terrorism & Political Violence 265 (1995); Jeff Vize,
Torture, Forced Confessions, and Inhuman Punishments: Human Rights Abuses in the Japanese Penal System,
20 UCLA P. Basin L.J. 329 (2003); see also John J. Donahue, Some Perspectives on Crime and Criminal
Justice Policy, in The Crime Conundrum, supra, at 45, 46 (noting European property crime rates are "as high
as or higher than those in the United States"). For more discussion of United States crime rates, see infra nn.
86-87 and accompanying text.
4. On a somewhat similar theme, see Jim Huffman's contribution to this symposium, James L. Huffman,
From Legal History to Legal Theory: Or Is It the Other Way Around? 40 Tulsa L. Rev. : /9 (2005).
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PROGRESS AND JUSTIFICATION
criminal law and criminal justice. The second-and one with which Friedman openly
wrestles-is the idea of progress itself. My discussion of justification will touch on two
areas: provocation and the law of torture. I want to suggest not only that justification
arguments pull against and undermine the ideal of a rational and progressive criminal
law, but also that the resulting mess is something we must accept and that we should
consider celebrating rather than bemoaning. As for progress, my concern is to bring out
the anxiety produced by the tension between liberalism and concrete progress in the area
of criminal justice, to consider the relationship between progress and authoritarian
government, and to question the very ideal of progress in criminal law and in law
generally.
II. SOME PROBLEMS WITH PROGRESS
The idea of progress is, of course, a problematic concept in American history.
Progress is something we associate with enlightenment and modernity, and modernity
has not been in fashion for quite some time in academia even as it retains its hold on a
United States political discourse that dreams of bringing democracy and free markets to
all sectors of our own society and everyone else's too.5 And apart from one's stance
toward modernity, it remains the case that calling something "Whig history" is generally
perceived by historians as fighting words. For his part, Friedman has been a critic of
progress narratives. In Crime and Punishment, for example, he insists that the book is
not a story of "progress" or "celebrat[ion]. '6 Yet at the same time, he cannot help but
note approvingly the changes that have taken place in the United States, particularly on
issues relating to race and gender, 7 and to decry the "backlash" against some of these
changes. 8 With more subtlety, the entire structure of the book seems aimed at forcing
serious consideration by scholars and policymakers of the social history and sociology of
crime and our responses to it, with the express goal of doing better, of achieving
reform-which is a smaller, less utopian way of talking about progress.
9
5. See e.g. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 160 (Alan Sheridan trans.,
Pantheon Bks. 1977) (arguing "the progress of societies" was a discovery of the eighteenth century); Carl
Schmitt, The Concept of the Political 73 (George Schwab trans., U. Chi. Press 1996) ("The enlightened
eighteenth century believed in a clear and simple upward line of human progress.... The line moved between
two points: from religious fanaticism to intellectual liberty, from dogma to criticism, from superstition to
enlightenment, from darkness to light."); Sheldon S. Wolin, Archaism, Modernity, and Democracy in America,
in The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution 66, 69-70 (Johns Hopkins Press 1989)
[hereinafter The Presence of the Past] (describing postmodem skepticism about the claims of modernity).
6. Friedman, supra n. 1, at 12, 14.
7. See id at 13 (noting "the culture of individualism... worked a revolution in the law of groups, races,
and classes" that was "probably for the good"); id. at 14 (arguing changes in criminal justice have left us
"considerably better off; but at a rather stiff price"); id. at 434 (noting the increased voice of women on
criminal justice issues); see also Friedman, Dead Hands, supra n. 3, at 924 (noting "society is better today,
more humane, more caring than it ever was in the nineteenth century; or the first part of this century");
Friedman & Fisher, supro n. 3, at 6 ("There is progress [on police violence], but it seems awfully slow."); id. at
16 (counseling those concerned with criminal justice polices to "be patient with the pace [of change]. Progress
will be slow, and we must take heart at small successes.").
8. Friedman, supra n. 1, at 305, 404; see also id. at 319 (regretting that the contemporary prospects for
abolishing or reducing the death penalty are "fairly bleak").
9. See id at 356 (arguing the "war on drugs" has been an "[exercise] in futility" that ignores "sane voices"
advocating "a more rational course of action"); see also Friedman & Fisher, supra n. 3, at 4:
2005]
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There are good reasons to be suspicious of the kinds of things we often call
"progress." To believe in and work for progress, after all, we first have to define it,
which almost always requires defining it against something else, and then we have to
chart a path toward achieving it. By that point, we are already deep in problems.
Consider the following example. In early August of 2004, the New York Times ran
a column by Nicholas D. Kristof with the provocative title, "Martyrs, Virgins and
Grapes." Kristof begins the column by relating that Muslims believe their martyrs will
be received in paradise by a multitude of virgins, and he links this incentive to the
September 1 I th attacks. But then Kristof reveals that "a growing body of rigorous
scholarship" is challenfing this kind of idea and charting a path "toward a reawakening
of the Islamic world."I
To make a long story short, it turns out that Muslims do not know what the Koran
really means, primarily because their interpretations are "frozen in the model of classical
commentaries written nearly two centuries after the prophet's death." 12  Luckily for
Muslims, some scholars are employing western research methods to reveal the true
meaning of the Koran, and it turns out that all of the things we in the West do not like
about Islam-a virgin-filled paradise for terrorist martyrs and the veil, for example-are
simply misinterpretations. "Encouraging signs" exist of an "intellectual awakening" that
will allow "the Islamic world to get on its feet again."
13
Kristof is spinning a story of progress. He claims good intentions: he does not
want Muslim kids to be tempted to engage in suicide terrorism by the lure of virgins in
paradise, he wants greater gender equality in the Muslim world, and he believes in free
speech and debate on religious, scientific, and political topics. But look at how he does
it. Western hermeneutics, which are more rigorous than archaic Muslim theological
studies, will inscribe correct and liberating understandings of the Koran on a supine
Islamic world. As a result, the Islamic world will open itself to forward-looking,
western, liberal ideas, and will eventually get back "on its feet."
Whatever voices of reason are likely to be heard will have to come from outside politics. Scholars
who study the problem can provide these voices, as can professionals in criminal justice. Working
together, academics and professionals must try to persuade a weary public and its wary representa-
tives that marginal increases in deterrent power come at a very high price.
For what it is worth, although I am as likely as any law professor to propose doctrinal reforms, I suspect I am
less interested in reform for the sake of progress in the sense that I use the word in this paper. Further, I see no
reason why advocating or achieving progress should be a significant goal for legal academics. See infra n. 37.
10. Nicholas D. Kristof, Martyrs, Virgins and Grapes, 153 N.Y. Times A17 (Aug. 4, 2004).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. For a more sophisticated and nuanced but similar set of claims, see Max Rodenbeck, Islam
Confronts Its Demons, 51 N.Y. Rev. of Bks. 14 (Apr. 29, 2004).
[Vol. 40:639
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PROGRESS AND JUSTIFICATION
Contemporary scholars call this kind of thinking Orientalism. 14  Kristof has a
vision of a progressive western world that will act upon and change-civilize-an
exotic, static, and emphatically not modem Muslim world. There is a clear line here
from Rudyard Kipling to Kristof.15 More pointedly, it is this exotic, weirdly sexualized
world (in which important decisions turn on the availability of virgins in paradise1 6), and
not the modem, liberal and rational West, that produces terrorism and thus stands (or,
rather, reclines) in need of progress. And, of course, this image helps "us" define
ourselves-that is, we create ourselves from the contrast we draw between the free,
forward-looking, and well-intentioned West and the backward-looking, terrorist-
producing, repressed, and repressive Muslim world. 
17
A few more examples should confirm the complexity of the progress ideal. The
first is the idea of toleration, which Friedman has commented on in his own work.
Toleration is a goal and to some extent a characteristic of liberal, pluralist democracy.
Michael Walzer, for example, argues that toleration makes peaceful coexistence-which
he defines as a basic moral good-possible. Further, Walzer claims, "Toleration makes
difference possible; difference makes toleration necessary."'
18
14. Or more properly, defining and positioning the Orient as "in need of corrective study by the West" is a
key aspect of Orientalism. See Edward W. Said, Orientalism 41 (Pantheon Bks. 1978); see also id. at 12, 86,
298 (providing more general descriptions of Orientalism). Also worth noting is Said's famous critique of
Bernard Lewis, in which he attributed to Lewis and to Orientalism as a discourse the idea that "Islam does not
develop, and neither do Muslims; they merely are, and they are to be watched." Id. at 317. In fact, of course,
Islam and "the Muslim world" are not monolithic, and the forces of modernity operate in and on them as they
do everywhere. See Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and
Terrorism, 104 Am. Anthropologist 766, 772 (2002) ("Contemporary 'fundamentalism' is a modern political
project, not a traditional cultural leftover."); Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 Yale L.J. 1399 (2003)
(focusing on activists in Muslim communities to describe a complex mix of religious and secular arguments for
certain human rights); infra nn. 24-27 and accompanying text (discussing human rights discourse); see also
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Republic of Choice 206 (Harv. U. Press 1990) (arguing fundamentalism and
nationalism "are, in a real sense, deep passions that modernity makes possible, even though nationalists or
fundamentalists reject modernity or limit its effects"); Rodenbeck, supra n. 13 (describing various movements
and schools of thought that pull in different directions within Islam even as he claims the power to define
"authentic Muslim modernists" as a category limited to those who are skeptics of "the whole Islamic
tradition"). In this context, Kristof's reference to the veil is particularly revealing. See Leila Ahmed, The
Discourse of the Veil, in Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate 144, 165-68 (Yale
U. Press 1992).
15. See Rudyard Kipling, The White Man's Burden (1899), available at http://www.online-
literature.com/kipling/922/ (accessed Oct. 7, 2005). For another recent Kiplingesque argument, see Norman
Podhoretz, World War IV. How It Started, What It Means, and Why We Have to Win, Commentary 17, 47
(Sept. 2004) (urging "a benevolent transformation of the Middle East" by the United States that would include
"the reform and modernization of Islam").
16. One wonders how Kristof would describe the motives of the many suicide bombers who are both
Muslim and female. For a more useful discussion of suicide terrorism, see Elena A. Baylis, The Inevitable
Impunity of Suicide Terrorists, in Evil, Law, and the State: Perspectives on State Power and Violence 111
(John T. Parry ed., forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Evil, Law, and the State].
17. For a more sustained but similar analysis that focuses on the status of Arab-Americans after September
11 th, see Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1575 (2002). For a similar reading and
comparison in the context of late Victorian representations of Europe and Asia, see Andrea Hibbard, Monu-
mental Decadence: The Great Exhibition and the Albert Memorial, 7 Australasian Victorian Stud. J. 26, 32-33
(2001). For a discussion of the American South as the subject of a kind of Orientalism, see infra n. 36.
18. Michael Walzer, On Toleration xii (Yale U. Press 1997). For a somewhat different definition of
toleration as a necessary way to harmonize "value-pluralism" and individual autonomy, see Joseph Raz, The
Morality of Freedom 401-07 (Clarendon Press 1986).
2005]
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Yet Walzer surely could have pushed the point further. Toleration does not only
make space for difference; it defines it. The act of tolerating entails defining difference
and defining groups: we are the people who believe X, we are different from the people
who believe Y. Moreover, toleration is usually part of a power dynamic. Even as it
defines difference, it also defines hierarchy. Tolerating is a way of acting on another
group, of expressing domination and control: we are strong enough or secure enough to
tolerate you. Indeed, toleration may work best when a dominant group sets the terms,
which, of course, include preventing the dominated group from having enough space to
challenge the dominant. 19 As Friedman puts it, "toleration meant allowing.... It was
always clear in the United States which norms were dominant, which culture defined the
true nation, which people actually owned the house of America, and which people were
the tolerated guests." 20  Thus, toleration clearly has positive effects, but its overall
impact is complicated. Progress toward an ideal of toleration (whatever the specific
content of that ideal, because there are always limits to how much we tolerate) is also an
insistence on the power to define the differences that get tolerated, the limits of
toleration, and, by extension, the continued and now legitimated punishments for the
things we do not tolerate.
2 1
The welfare state provides another example. For many of us, the creation-or
partial creation in the United States--of a welfare system, with its various safety nets
relating to jobs, health, children, aging, etc., is a form of real progress, a triumph of
humanitarian impulses. People are better off; they suffer less; there is less misery in the
world. But welfare systems also reflect technocracy-the development and deployment
of knowledge through rational, bureaucratic structures to achieve policy goals that are
visible to the extent they manage or change the lives of persons.2 2 And, as Sheldon
19. Walzer goes some way toward this point, as when he notes that "[i]n ordinary speech, it is often said
that toleration is always a relationship of inequality where the tolerated groups or individuals are cast in an
inferior position." Walzer, supra n. 18, at 52. He goes on to admit that toleration "[s]ometimes... works best
when relations of political superiority and inferiority are clearly marked and commonly recognized." Id.; see
also id. at xi ("As an American Jew, I grew up thinking of myself as an object of toleration."). Consider, as an
example of this dynamic, John Rawls's idea of "reasonable pluralism," which he defined in opposition to "the
fact of pluralism as such." John Rawls, Political Liberalism 36 (Columbia U. Press 1993). That is, reasonable
pluralism comprises "the doctrines that reasonable citizens affirm ... not simply the upshot of self- and class
interests, or of peoples' understandable tendency to view the political world from a limited standpoint." Id. at
36-37. Rawls-whose efforts to bring liberal theory to a culminating point exemplify the modem commitment
to progress-advocated toleration of doctrines that meet the definition of reasonable pluralism, but he seems to
have excluded any commitment that would use political power to insist on and impose its views and thereby
challenge the political and social structure upon which he insisted. For Rawls, therefore, toleration applied to
those who first accepted the dominance of reasonable pluralism. See id. at 60-62. For a more sympathetic and
nuanced discussion of reasonable pluralism and public reason in Rawls's thought, see Samuel Freeman, Public
Reason and Political Justifications, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 2021 (2004).
20. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Shattered Mirror: Identity, Authority, and Law, 58 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
23, 28 (2001).
21. And, of course, toleration is also vulnerable to criticism from the other direction-that it risks fostering
relativism at the expense of essential cultural values that need to be preserved. See Stephen D. Smith,
Toleration and Liberal Commitments, http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1003&context
=sandiegolwps (Mar. 1, 2004) (associating this view with what he calls "illiberalism" while also arguing that
"ultra-liberalism"-which seeks to treat all beliefs as equal-is untenable).
22. See Sheldon S. Wolin, Democracy and the Welfare State: The Political and Theoretical Connection
Between Staatsrason and Wohlfahrsstaatsrson, in The Presence of the Past, supra n. 5, at 151, 171-73. For a
classic articulation of bureaucracy and its perils, see From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 196-244 (H.H.
Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., Oxford U. Press 1946). For a powerful criticism of the legal doctrines that
[Vol. 40:639
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Wolin has argued, the United States welfare system has increased the power of the
government over-and, indeed, helps to define-marginal groups who "are kept
suspended between hope and despair but not plunged into desperation." 23 The progress
of the welfare state, then, puts people under the control of a state that is capricious and
rational at the same time, a result which few would describe as unqualifiedly good.
Finally, consider international human rights, which are in some sense the ultimate
symbol of rational, western, progressive ideals. But to the extent human rights discourse
defines human rights as a western achievement (even if described in universal terms) to
be imposed on countries assumed to have no awareness or practice of rights, advocacy of
international human rights is also a colonial and imperial project. Further, to the extent
that acceptance of western human rights discourse is a price of (junior) membership in
the western club, it is an imposition-again, a new and improved version of colonialism.
Even the expansion of human rights norms into the economic realm risks reinforcing and
legitimizing western economic power by accepting it as the baseline against which rights
will operate.
I want to make clear that I am not trying to make a cultural relativism argument.
Human rights norms already exist in non-western countries, where they are part and
parcel of modernity and the politics of nation-states, just as in the West. 24  For that
support bureaucracy, see Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev.
1276 (1984); see also Lawrence M. Friedman, On Legal Development, 24 Rutgers L. Rev. 11, 34 (1970)
(noting the conflicts within bureaucracies between different rationalities). As this paper focuses on criminal
law and criminal justice, it is worth noting that the prison system can be included in the list of institutions that
comprise the welfare state in the sense that I have described it, but that linkage is less apparent today-
although, of course, prisons still share the goal of managing and controlling persons and remain vulnerable to
the criticism of welfare institutions that I advance here. See generally David Garland, The Culture of Control:
Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (U. Chi. Press 2001) [hereinafter Garland, Culture of
Control]; see also Friedman, supra n. 14, at 146 (noting the link between the rise of disciplinary punishments
and efforts to rationalize criminal justice); Garland, Culture of Control, supra, at 34 (describing as "high
modernism" the "ideology that believes social problems are best managed by specialist bureaucracies that are
directed by the state, informed by experts, and rationally directed towards particular tasks"); David Garland,
Penal Modernism and Postmodernism, in Punishment and Social Control 181, 186-89 (Thomas C. Blomberg
& Stanley Cohen eds., Aldine de Gruyter 1995) (describing "penal modernism"); Jonathan Simon, Poor
Discipline: Parole and the Social Control of the Underclass, 1890-1990 (U. Chi. Press 1993) (discussing in the
context of parole the waning of modem ideas of punishment in favor of what the author describes as
postmodern techniques of control). For more discussion of punishment issues, see infra nn. 85-114 and
accompanying text.
23. Wolin, supra n. 22, at 161. Wolin asks, "[W]hat are the political implications of humanitarianism, of
classifying citizens as needy and of making them needful objects of state power?" Id. at 154. See also
Friedman, Twentieth Century, supra n. 3, at 536-38 (describing how welfare reform inscribes definitions of
welfare recipients and cements their status as marginalized). For a more traditional analysis of the welfare
state's failings in the United Kingdom and United States, see Garland, Culture of Control, supra n. 22, at 92-
94. For a discussion of criticisms of the correctional system that dovetail with Wolin's criticism of the welfare
state, see id. at 55-57 (discussing the American Friends Service Committee's 1971 report, Struggle for Justice).
My criticism is not intended as advocacy of privatization or as an expression of faith in market forces. Indeed,
to the extent markets are dominated by large corporations, the problem of bureaucracy remains-see Frug,
supra n. 22-hardly surprising given that bureaucracy reflects the ideals of modem society, not just those of
the set of formal institutions we characterize as governmental.
24. For a discussion that highlights some of the ways in which people in countries seen as static, traditional,
and non-westem are in fact part of modem societies within which they advance human rights norms drawn
from a variety of sources as part of a complex set of political rhetorics, see Sunder, supra n. 14. Where I differ
from Sunder is, first, in her insistence that the state and religious institutions occupy separate spheres. While
liberal theory seems to posit that religion and state are separate, religion is a central and always present-even
if, or perhaps because, contested-component of the modem nation state. I also question Sunder's decision to
embed her analysis within a rhetoric of progress toward unquestioned and somehow post-liberal ideals of
2005]
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matter, human rights norms often function in the West as much or more as a rhetorical
device than as an effective constraint on behavior-as domestic police violence and the
recent torture controversies underscore. 25 Thus, it is sometimes difficult to identify the
countries in which these norms have the most practical effect. 26  Finally, it is worth
considering why the international human rights community wants to bind all nations to a
universal code-perhaps with good intentions, but perhaps also from a desire to
rationalize and control (shades of Kipling again, on both counts). 27 I am not claiming
individualism and democracy--even though these ideals are themselves components of the liberal project and
in that sense are also techniques of social control.
25. For discussion of torture by Japan, see Vize, supra n. 3. For discussion of torture by Britain, France,
Israel, and the United States, see infra nn. 65-79 and accompanying text. For discussion of police violence in
the United States, see John T. Parry, Judicial Restraints on Illegal State Violence: Israel and the United States,
35 Vand. J. Transnatl. L. 73 (2002) [hereinafter Parry, Judicial Restraints], and sources cited therein. Against
the reality of widespread coercive interrogation in the United States and by United States personnel, consider
our rhetoric against torture. I do not mean merely claims by administration officials that the United States does
not use torture or that the United States opposes torture. See John T. Parry, Escalation and Necessity: Defining
Torture at Home and Abroad, in Torture: A Collection 145, 145-46 (Sanford Levinson ed., Oxford U. Press
2004) [hereinafter Parry, Escalation and Necessity]. The United States has also publicly ratified the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
("Convention"). As if to underscore the rhetorical nature of this act, however, when the Senate gave its consent
to the Convention, it did what it usually has done in recent years with human rights treaties: it included a
declaration that the Convention is not self-executing (which means it cannot be the source of legal rights
without implementing legislation) and that in any event the rights described in the Convention go no further
than the rights already established by the Constitution. See 136 Cong. Rec. 36192-36193 (1990) (pts. 1(2),
III(1)). As a result, the Convention is law but not-law, and to the extent it is law, it is defined as redundant
(again as a kind of not-law or at least as needless law). Treating the Convention this way furthers nationalist
goals by celebrating the Constitution as already giving us the rights that international law is only now
establishing and by discrediting international law as unnecessary. For a convincing defense of the
constitutionality of this practice, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and
Conditional Consent, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2000). For a description and analysis of the U.N.'s response, see
Elena A. Baylis, General Comment 24: Confronting the Problem of Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, 17
Berkeley J. Intl. L. 277 (1999). For an overview of issues relating to self-execution, see Carlos M. Vdzquez,
The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. Intl. L. 695 (1995). Worth noting as well is a pair of
statements in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004), that seem to indicate the Supreme Court's
acceptance of non-self-execution declarations. First, the Court observed that "the Senate has expressly
declined to give the federal courts the task of interpreting and applying international human rights law, as when
its ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declared that the substantive
provisions of the document were not self-executing." Id. at 2763 (citation omitted). That declaration, in turn,
supported the Court's self-consciously cautious stance toward recognizing causes of action under the Alien
Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Second, the Court stated:
[A]lthough the Covenant does bind the United States as a matter of international law, the United
States ratified the Covenant on the express understanding that it was not self-executing and so did
not itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts. Accordingly, Alvarez cannot say that
the [Covenant itself] establish[es] the relevant and applicable rule of international law.
Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2767 (citation omitted).
26. Cf. Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1181 (2001) (noting, among
other things, how a focus on Third World cultures as sites of violence against women simultaneously
characterizes the United States as less defined by such problems and obscures the comparable rates of violence
against women that exist in the United States).
27. For recent discussions of these issues, see Mashood A. Baderin, International Human Rights and
Islamic Law 23-32 (Oxford U. Press 2003); David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing
International Humanitarianism 9-35, 141-44 (Princeton U. Press 2004); Heidi Morrison, Beyond Universalism,
1 Muslim World J. Hum. Rights, issue 1, art. 2 (2004) (available at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent
.cgi?article=1006&context=nwjhr); Sundhya Pahuja, 'This is the World: Have Faith,' 15 Eur. J. Intl. L. 381
(2004); Marianna Valverde, Review Essay, I L., Culture & the Humanities 119, 128-31 (2005). For critical
discussions of the political theory of human rights, see Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and
Bare Life 121 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., Stan. U. Press 1998) (arguing "the spaces, the liberties, and the
rights won by individuals in their conflicts with central powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but
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international human rights are bad; in most cases I am all for them. But what we cannot
do is pretend that human rights discourse and the liberal individualism it rests upon are
neutral, universal, or necessarily separate from western dominance--or even that they
are in fact liberating in some objective sense.
Progress, in short, cannot happen without observation, classification, and
rationalization-the creation of knowledge, organizational frameworks, and structures
that allow the domination and manipulation of people. We all do it in our work, all the
time. We study, we reason, we understand, and we become the experts, the
professionals, the people to whom others go for knowledge about a particular thing or
doctrine or period. Moreover, these structures of knowledge may claim to, but do not in
fact, operate along a disinterested arc of applied expertise. The distinctions and
categories we create and work within impose differences that themselves reflect and
reinforce power relationships. Put differently, progress is almost always about
exercising power on people we have defined to need our help--that is, as objects of
surveillance, understanding, and control.28 Historical narratives of progress perform this
process by defining the objects of power, legitimating the exercise of power on them,
and articulating the goals that have been met and that remain to be achieved. 29 These
observations do not mean we should stop doing history or, for that matter, that we should
increasing inscription of individuals' lives within the state order, thus offering a new and more dreadful
foundation for the very sovereign power from which they wanted to liberate themselves"); Roberto
Buonamano, Humanity and Inhumanity: State Power and the Force of Law in the Prescription of Juridical
Norms, in Evil, Law, and the State, supra n. 16, at 159, 169 (concluding human rights are "not a benign
development of a humanistic ideal that proclaims the sacrosanctity of human life, nor the final exposition of a
philosophical position on the liberty of the individual against the intrusive effects of state sovereignty; rather,
[they are] an effect of the form of power exercised within the institution of the modem liberal state and through
the instrument of international law."). For a forceful rejection of such claims, see Volker Heins, Giorgio
Agamben and the Current State of Affairs in Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Policy, 6 German L.J. 845
(2005). For a more traditional appeal for sensitivity to substantive cultural norms in the process of imposing
western rule of law values, see Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the Rule
of Law, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2275 (2003). Friedman has long been interested in modernity and law's relation to
it, as well as in the imposition or adoption of western legal norms on or in other countries. See Lawrence M.
Friedman, Total Justice (Russell Sage Found. 1985); Friedman, On Legal Development, supra n. 22.
28. See Foucault, supra n. 5, at 148-49, 160-61; Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An
Introduction 92-102 (Robert Hurley trans., Allen Lane 1978) [hereinafter Foucault, History of Sexuality];
Michel Foucault, "Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976, at 7-10, 29-39
(David Macey trans, Picador 2003) [hereinafter Foucault, Society Must Be Defended]. For useful discussions
and critiques of Foucault's articulation of biopolitics and the power-knowledge relationship, see Nancy Fraser,
Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory 17-66 (U. Minn. Press 1989);
David Garland, Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory 151-92 (U. Chi. Press 1990);
Sheldon S. Wolin, On the Theory and Practice of Power, in After Foucault: Humanistic Knowledge,
Postmodern Challenges 179 (Jonathan Arac ed., Rutgers U. Press 1988) [hereinafter After Foucault].
29. See H.D. Harootunian, Foucault, Genealogy, History: The Pursuit of Otherness, in After Foucault,
supra n. 28, at 110, 113:
What distinguished [Foucault's] so-called histories from the conventional practice was his decision
to see history as both a form of knowledge and power at the same time, like any other discourse. By
apprehending the historian's practice in this way, he was able to show how an activity that appealed
to knowing the truth about the past was merely a mask for a will to domination. The desire to know
the past was driven, not by a disinterested quest for knowledge and truth, but by the urge to domes-
ticate and control it in order to validate the present.
Worth noting is that historians in the United States have long been concerned, sometimes critically and
sometimes not, with issues of objectivity, presentism, and progress. See e.g. Peter Novick, That Noble Dream:
The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge U. Press 1988); see also supra
n. 7 and accompanying text (discussing Friedman as a critic of progress narratives).
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stop seeking changes in economic, political, and social conditions. But at a minimum we
must realize that the articulation of objectives and the linkage of them with technologies
of progress are all too often taken as foundational rather than as contestable assertions.
30
So far, my critique of progress follows some standard and perhaps even dated
moves that emphasize particular aspects of complex ideas and phenomena. Yet my
overall focus on criminal law makes the ground worth going over again. The need to
question "progress" and its close relative, "reform," is particularly salient when
discussing state power and violence, particularly in its most open and obvious forms,
such as criminal justice (not to mention foreign policy and international affairs, which
often involve the application of criminal justice-like norms on a broader stage).
III. JUSTIFICATION AND CONFLICT
A. Provocation
In criminal law, justification turns doctrinally on the idea that a person accused of
a criminal act did the right thing even though she broke the law. That is, she admits not
only that her conduct ordinarily would be considered illegal, but also that she acted with
a mens rea sufficient to support a conviction; yet she insists she should not be held
responsible or punished because her actions were justified-they were the right and
proper thing to do. Thus, although justification is sometimes described as turning on a
balance of harms, we do better to think of it as a moral judgment about proper behavior




Consider the example of the provocation doctrine, which traditionally reduces an
unlawful killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter. At common law, only a limited
number of things qualified as legally adequate provocation, among them a man
discovering his wife in the act of committing adultery, with the result that if he killed his
wife or her lover the killings would be only manslaughter. Although provocation
doctrine has been reformed and now tends to turn on a reasonableness standard, juries
still frequently choose manslaughter over murder for men who kill their wives or their
wives' lovers after discovering the affair.
32
30. Cf Schmitt, supra n. 5, at 76, arguing the enlightenment triumphed over
the absolute state and a feudal aristocracy; and with the disappearance of the enemy it has lost its
original meaning.... Economy is no longer eo ipso freedom; technology does not serve comforts
only, but just as much the production of dangerous weapons and instruments. Progress no longer
produces eo ipso the humanitarian and moral perfection which was considered progress in the
eighteenth century.
31. See United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 200 (9th Cir. 1991) (Fernandez, J., concurring); George P.
Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 792 (Little, Brown & Co. 1978); John T. Parry, The Virtue of Necessity:
Reshaping Culpability and the Rule of Law, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 397, 432-46 (1999).
32. For a good overview of the doctrine in this context, see Cynthia Lee, Murder and the Reasonable Man:
Passion and Fear in the Criminal Courtroom 17-45 (NYU Press 2003). For an explanation of the common law
rule, see Francis Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States 237 (James Kay, Jun. & Bro.
1846) (describing the provocation produced when "a man finds another in the act of adultery with his wife" as
of"so grievous a nature as the law reasonably concludes cannot be borne in the first transport of passion; where
the injury is irreparable and can never be compensated"). For a critical analysis of reforms in provocation law,
see Victoria Nourse, Passion 's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 Yale L.J.
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Moreover, as Friedman notes in Crime and Punishment, beginning in the mid to
late nineteenth century, husbands who killed their wives' lovers also invoked the so-
called "honor" or "unwritten law" defense. 33  The honor defense typically blended
provocation with a claim of temporary insanity. 34  And unlike provocation, which
usually resulted only in reduction of the degree of homicide,3 5 the unwritten law was a
complete defense-though one might be tempted to categorize it as an appeal to jury
nullification rather than as a legitimate legal claim.
36
1331 (1997). Provocation claims arise in many contexts beyond sexual relationships, but my discussion will
focus on this narrower group of claims. I also realize that provocation is not always described as a partial
justification, and my use of the term is somewhat colloquial-an assertion of how provocation claims are often
assessed in the context of sexual infidelity-and is not meant as a claim of proper doctrinal classification. As
Nourse explains in detail, provocation claims in this context lead juries to make normative choices about
relationships and gender roles, see id. at 1333-38, 1392-94, and it is that insight which leads me to talk about
provocation as a justification and not merely as an excuse, because it focuses on proper conduct within a
relationship. See also R.A. Duff, Rethinking Justifications, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 829 (2004) (arguing for a fairly
large definition of what counts as a justification but also urging less attention to the distinction between
justification and excuse); Jeremy Horder, Provocation and Responsibility 111-36 (Clarendon Press 1992)
(explaining the justificatory aspects of provocation). Compare Oliver L. Barbour, The Magistrates' Criminal
Law: A Practical Treatise on the Jurisdiction, Duty, and Authority of Justices of the Peace in the State of New
York in Criminal Cases 49 (Win. & A. Gould & Co. 1841) (stating a husband's killing of his wife's lover "in
the first transport of passion . . . is excusable"), with Gerald Leonard, Towards a Legal History of American
Criminal Theory: Culture and Doctrine from Blackstone to the Model Penal Code, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 691,
724 n. 129 (2003) (describing an 1804 treatise on Kentucky criminal law as treating a husband finding his wife
committing adultery as "nearly a justification for the killing"). As for the honor defense, the fact of complete
acquittal and the whiff of jury nullification more strongly support the conclusion that the defense is all about a
moral judgment, and in particular the judgment the defendant acted as a man should act (although, of course,
one could still use the language of excuse to claim that juries simply decided that men could not be expected to
control their passions in this context and so should be excused, even if what they did was wrong). See Jeremy
D. Weinstein, Student Author, Adultery, Law, and the State: A History, 38 Hastings L.J. 195, 227-38 (1986)
(providing a history of the unwritten law and characterizing it as a justification); cf Dan M. Kahan, The Secret
Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 429-35 (1999) (discussing the "true man" or honor doctrine
primarily in the context of the no-retreat rule).
33. See Friedman, supra n. 1, at 221-22.
34. See id. at 146-47.
35. In at least one state, New York, provocation could also justify a complete acquittal on homicide
charges. For a discussion of the New York statute and its application, see Barbour, supra n. 32 at 47-49.
Wharton quoted the New York statute, see Wharton, supra n. 32, at 220-21, but he ignored its significance in
his discussion of provocation. See id. at 234 (stating provocation can never justify or excuse a homicide).
36. In Georgia, New Mexico, Texas, and Utah, however, some version of the honor defense was codified.
See Weinstein, supra n. 32, at 227-38; see also Friedman, supra n. 1, at 426 (noting a Delaware statute that
reduced manslaughter from a felony to a misdemeanor when a husband killed "a person found in the act of
adultery with his wife"). It is worth noting here how discussions, including Friedman's, of the relationship
between "honor" and criminal law doctrine are often set in a sectional context, so that honor is seen as a
Southern (and sometimes Western) concern, by contrast to the more rational North. See id. at 75 (describing
the antebellum South as "feudal" and "backward"); id. at 178 (claiming the antebellum South was obsessed
with honor, as exemplified by dueling, and thus was "prelegal, prerational, aristocratic"); id. at 188-89
(insisting lynching was a Southern practice distinct from other American manifestations of vigilante justice);
Friedman, Some Remarks, supra n. 3, at 1129-30 (suggesting Southern culture breeds violence); see also
Kahan, supra n. 32, at 432-35 (discussing the influence of slave and frontier cultures in developing ideas of
honor in the South and West that led to different doctrines on the duty to retreat). Yet "honor" is a concept that
people in many parts of the United States still take seriously, especially in the context of gender and sexual
relations, and many honor defense cases, including most of the early, significant cases, took place in the North.
More rational Northern law could display a tendency to "orientalize" the South by speaking of honor as a
peculiarly Southern obsession in need of correction. Going further, I want to suggest that just as many in the
United States and Western Europe see the Muslim world as an exotic other; the South fills the same role within
the United States. It is a traditional society that needs to become modem (even though it has grappled with
modernity for just as long as the rest of the country), and it is the locus of institutionalized racism and perhaps,
too, of particularly pernicious forms of sexism (thus absolving other regions of the country). Although this
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Seen in this way, provocation doctrine, particularly as applied to marital violence,
does not accord with the substantive goals that we generally associate with progress in
criminal law doctrine (and the honor defense is decidedly retrograde). 37 Against the
rationality of legal rules (the creation of which is another progressive goal), these claims
create exceptions for, and partially or completely justify, violence fueled by emotion and
sexual jealousy. They entrench and endorse norms about gender roles and relationships
that put women in a subordinate position defined by male control of their bodies and
their disparate vulnerability to violence.
Yet the story of provocation and the honor defense is more complicated. Consider
the 1844 case of Amelia Norman. Norman was seduced in New York City by a man
named Henry Ballard. They had a child together, but he abandoned her soon thereafter.
When he refused to provide any support for her or their child, she tracked him down and
stabbed him. Norman's trial for attempted murder became a sensation, and the New
York papers ran extensive excerpts of the proceedings. Although she never denied her
act, the jury acquitted her in a matter of minutes, and the papers celebrated her freedom
while disparaging her seducer.
38
Norman triumphed because her lawyers used the honor defense. The claim of
provocation was not sufficient to support the admission of evidence about Ballard's
seduction and mistreatment of Norman, because the judge was concerned that Ballard's
actions were not close enough in time to support a heat of passion claim. To get around
that problem, her lawyers also contended that the seduction had driven her insane. The
insanity claim allowed the jury to learn enough about Norman's history to conclude that
she had been wronged and that Ballard was the true villain.
Norman's case became the template for legal change. Her trial served as the
catalyst for reform of civil and criminal laws relating to seduction, and several women
who killed, or attempted to kill, their seducers used the honor defense with a surprising
degree of success. 39 But Norman's case was also critical for the development of the
version of the American South no longer exists (except perhaps as self-caricature), if it ever fully did, and the
days in which we could measure progress by contrasting a positive vision of the rest of the country with a
negative vision of the South are long gone, the "South" persists for many people as a reference point and a
thing to be acted on and against, and thus as a contrast with, and method of, defining the "progressive" parts of
the country. (And, too, the mythological "South" also becomes a positive touchstone of identity for large
numbers of people, including many who have little objective claim to its supposed traditions and character.)
37. Throughout this discussion, I use the word "progress" solely to refer to the effort to assess criminal law
doctrines to determine their consistency with progressive values and to improve doctrines by making them
more rational and better able to generate what progress seekers define as substantively good results.
Importantly, although I tend to agree with the substantive results that progress seekers desire, I do not mean to
use "progress" in this discussion as a personal, normative assertion of how the criminal law actually should
look. Cf Paul Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law (U. Chi. Press 1999) (distinguishing between a cultural study
of law and scholarship that is committed to legal reform). Similarly, the proposal I make for the application of
criminal law defenses is not intended to generate substantively good results; I seek instead to move criminal
law out of progress discourse altogether (in part, admittedly, because of a normative concern about the
rationalizing aspect of progress and a sense that partial achievement of the substantive aims of progress may
not be worth the cost).
38. For a more complete discussion of the facts and proceedings, as well as an extensive analysis of the
case, the discourse of sentimentalism that informed it, and its legal and literary aftermath, see Andrea L.
Hibbard & John T. Parry, Law, Seduction, and the Sentimental Heroine: The Case of Amelia Norman,
(American Literature (forthcoming 2006)).
39. See id. Friedman suggests that the honor defense did not work for women because "[m]ost women who
killed former lovers were, in fact, convicted." Friedman, supra n. 1, at 221. Yet of the twelve female honor
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male honor defense. Norman's prosecution appears to have been only the second
publicized case in which defense counsel specifically used the provocation/insanity
claim that formed the doctrinal basis of the honor defense, and it served as a key
precedent in the 1859 trial of Congressman Daniel Sickles, a case that Friedman
highlights for giving the defense "a dramatic push forward.
'AO
To some extent, Norman merely took advantage of, and thereby reinforced, gender
norms that cast her as a vulnerable victim of seduction. Yet she also contested norms
that would have put her, at best, on the margins of the law's protections as both a violent
and a fallen woman. The pressure her case put on these norms was not just momentary;
it was sustained. In cases like Norman's, in other words, the common law provocation
doctrine and its cousin, the honor defense, served as vehicles for the confrontation
between and partial working out of changing and conflicting norms about gender and
violence. These doctrines provided a space for the articulation and evaluation of
emotional and moral claims and even, sometimes, for the achievement of moral reform
goals, both doctrinally and culturally.
Compare that process to the reformed provocation doctrine, which no longer has a
special category for male marital violence (and which also, of course, rejects the honor
defense), but which nonetheless licenses male violence on an arguably wider scale than
the common law because it applies in any relationship whenever provocation is
reasonable. Put differently, the doctrine appears neutral, an example of rational progress
or reform (after all, it turns on "reasonableness" and moves away from overt male
bias).4 1 Yet we should not mistake the doctrine for reality. The fact that criminal law
doctrine allows only reasonable provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter does not
translate into less marital violence or prevent juries from accepting male ownership of
female sexuality.42  At law and in the broader culture, change goes on, but the
substantive progress promised by criminal law reformers is more often an illusion.
43
cases reviewed by Robert Ireland, seven resulted in acquittals, with one hung jury, three convictions, and one
woman found insane and committed to an asylum. Robert M. Ireland, Frenzied and Fallen Females: Women
and Sexual Dishonor in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 3 J. Women's Hist. 95, 98 (1992).
40. Friedman, supra n. 1, at 221; see Hibbard & Parry, supra n. 38; Robert M. Ireland, The Libertine Must
Die: Sexual Dishonor and the Unwritten Law in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 23 J. Soc. Hist. 27, 31
(1989) (describing the Sickles trial as "the definitive statement of the higher law as it applied to libertines"
because it used "the classic method of... plead[ing] temporary insanity").
41. Of course, rational progress or reform could also lead to abolishing the provocation defense altogether.
See Horder, supra n. 32, at 192-97.
42. It might be equally accurate to speak of the contemporary state's-rather than, or in addition to,
men's-ownership of women's sexuality. The debate over abortion, for example, is in part about the
government's ability to define a series of consequences, social roles, and even an appropriate consciousness for
women who become pregnant, whether or not they choose to have an abortion. Or consider David Harris's
account of how United State s customs officials selected minority women for intrusive searches at
disproportionate rates in the 1990s. The search techniques used on these women included penetration, use of
laxatives, and disregard or even disbelief of pregnancy and menstrual cycles. See David A. Harris, Profiles in
Injustice: Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work 208-13, 216-17 (New Press 2002); see also id. at 218-20 (noting
the customs service modified its profiling policy in response to criticism). As a result, at the border-the
precise point where the symbolic and physical aspects of freedom and citizenship may be most significant-
women citizens learned that their ability to enter or leave the country came at the price of making themselves
available for inspection at a rate that signaled the state's greater interest in, or need to control, their bodies as
compared to men's bodies.
43. I am not arguing that law, legal doctrine, or legal argument are irrelevant to cultural or social change.
Friedman sometimes suggests that doctrine is necessarily subservient to social forces, see supra n. 2, although
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Traditionally, defenses that justify or excuse have made room in the criminal
process for emotions and moral claims as part of a larger evaluation of the defendant's
character, conduct, and choices.44 As such, they work against the idea of progress in
criminal law. Try as we might to develop more rational approaches to these defenses-
as with the reform of provocation doctrine-the best we are likely to achieve is the
substitution of concepts such as "reasonableness" or "deterrence," which seek to mask
normative content and judgments. 45  But rationality does not deliver substantive
progress. The results under reasonableness tests sometimes will accord with the desires
of reformers, but sometimes they will not. Reasonableness and deterrence rhetoric may
simply entrench the status quo by "concealing the patterning of the law on the
contestable social norms of the dominant social groups from whose ranks most judges,
legislators, and politically influential citizens come"46-a result that will only
incompletely serve the goal of substantive progress.
And, critically, reasonableness tests suggest a society in which only illegal
behavior is unreasonable, while anything that is not illegal is, by definition, reasonable.
So, with provocation, a husband guilty only of manslaughter, not murder, for killing his
adulterous wife is a man who has acted reasonably, even though he will suffer some
punishment. Similarly, a person who uses a handgun to kill an intruder in his home and
successfully pleads self-defense is the very definition of the reasonable man.
4 7
Reasonableness tests thus aid progress only in the sense that they drive moral claims out
of the criminal law (or conceal their use) and seek to construct a world in which only
legal arguments count in the construction of norms. The resulting norms, however, will
only accord accidentally with substantive reform goals.
his views are in fact more nuanced. See Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal
Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 197, 217 (1965)
("The very fact that a criminal statute has been enacted by the legislature is a powerful factor in making the
proscribed conduct illegitimate in the eyes of a potential actor, even when the actor disagrees with the purpose
of the law."); see also Mary L. Dudziak, Law, Modernization, and the Question of Agency in American Legal
History, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 591 (2005); Huffman, supra n. 4. I find more convincing the view that law is part of
the cultural processes that constitute social relations, so that it creates as well as reflects change. See Austin
Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, in
Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the Law: Moving Beyond Legal Realism 1, 14 (Austin Sarat &
Jonathan Simon eds., Duke U. Press 2003); see also Stephen M. Best, The Fugitive's Properties 110 (U. Chi.
Press 2004) (arguing "legal forms and legal procedures play a compositional role in modem culture, and,
reciprocally, literary and cultural texts assist in the fashioning of new social identities"); Frug, supra n. 22, at
1289 ("Society is constituted, in part, by law, and law is constituted, in part, by society.").
44. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 Colum.
L. Rev. 269 (1996); Nourse, supra n. 32, at 1390-92; Parry, supra n. 31, at 432-39. Although I tend in this
article to treat reason and emotion as paired opposites, emotional responses to events often reflect reasoned or
even reasonable assessments. The distance between emotion and reason is in any event not distinct; nor are
assessments of events necessarily classifiable solely as emotional or as rational. See generally Kahan &
Nussbaum, supra.
45. See Kahan, supra n. 32 (discussing deterrence); Lee, supra n. 32 (discussing reasonableness).
46. Kahan, supra n. 32, at 486; see also Friedman, supra n. 20, at 38-39 (arguing the commitment to
"objective rationality. .. by itself does not guarantee rational results, measured objectively").
47. For a discussion of the "reasonable man" and the persistence of gender bias in criminal doctrine, see
Lee, supra n. 32. For a discussion of gender bias in the related context of tort doctrine, see Martha Chamallas,
The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 463 (1998); see also id. at 489-90
(discussing the "reasonable man" standard).
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Against this progressive vision, we should consider letting moral and emotional
claims have a more prominent place in the decision of cases, as they had in Norman's
case. The considerations that will often be the deciding factors in any event could then
be confronted, argued over, and perhaps even resolved-if only provisionally.
Opponents of this move sometimes argue that the distasteful spectacle of normative
conflict undermines the rule of law by licensing ad hoc decisions and even legal chaos.
4 8
Under these views, the legislature (if anywhere) is the more appropriate place for moral
debates.
4 9
Yet without the exceptions created by these defenses, the criminal law risks losing
legitimacy because it shows itself unresponsive to the conflicts and complexities of
human experience, which go well beyond the language of reasonableness or deterrence.
Despite rhetoric to the contrary, rule of law values in criminal law do not require clear,
formal, and rationally-justified rules.50 Indeed, the ideal of the rule of law is not very
useful if it cannot make room for change, flexibility, and interaction with non-legal
norms, all of which are necessary to making and keeping a satisfactory legal system in
operation over time-which I would argue is a good functional definition of the rule of
law even if it eschews ideals of reason and progress.
5 1
48. See e.g. U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir. 1969) (arguing the necessity defense risks chaos
and anarchy); U.S. v. Jacobs, 704 F. Supp. 629, 630 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (same); Francis A. Allen, The Habits of
Legality: Criminal Justice and the Rule of Law 22 (Oxford U. Press 1996) (worrying justification claims may
"[validate] disobedience of penal commands on ad hoc determinations by courts"); Jerome Hall, General
Principles of Criminal Law 55 (2d ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1960) (voicing similar concerns).
49. Cf Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1001 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Value judgments, after all, should be voted on, not dictated."). In this way, rule of law formalists echo and
reinforce the law-politics distinction that sits at the heart of, and bedevils, American conceptions of the judicial
role in a constitutional democracy that practices judicial review. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165-66,
170-71 (1803). Compare this approach with Vivian Grosswald Curran, Politicizing the Crime Against
Humanity: The French Example, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 677, 678 (2003) ("It is misleading to discuss law as
being 'politicized' inasmuch as this implies an a priori 'un-politicized' concept of law. Such a concept is both
inaccurate and incoherent because, although law and politics are not identical, they are inseparable."). Further,
and despite the respect for legislation that some formalists profess, the law-politics distinction and the
identification of legislatures as the site for moral debates that risk passionate disagreement also support the idea
that the reasoned decisions of courts better exemplify "law" than do the less-reasoned, perhaps even emotional
or herd-like results of the legislative process. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.)
("An act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact,
cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority."); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Constitutional Self-Government 46-78 (Harv. U. Press 2001) (arguing the achievement of democratic self-
government requires modifying the identification of democracy with popular or legislative majorities in favor
of a conception that defines courts exercising the power of judicial review as democratic actors); Richard H.
Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 695, 714 (2001) (arguing a majority of the current
Supreme Court sees democracy-particularly electoral politics-as in need of judicially-imposed "order,
stability, and channeled, constrained forms of engagement"). The claim that elite courts can discern and
protect the deep commitments of the people as well as or better than legislative majorities is one of the most
difficult in the liberal constitutional tradition. Resolving the issue simply by defining judicial review as
democratic risks echoing the claim that authoritarian rule is democratic when it results from an election, or
even acclamation (although I am not suggesting that the two claims simply reduce to being the same things).
Cf Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy 16 (Ellen Kennedy trans., 2d ed., MIT Press 1985)
(insisting on the conceptual separation of democracy and parliamentarianism and claiming "[t]he will of the
people can be expressed just as well and perhaps better through acclamation, through something taken for
granted, an obvious and unchallenged presence, than through the statistical apparatus [of voting] that has been
constructed with such meticulousness").
50. See Parry, supra n. 31, at 448-53.
51. See id at 454-57; see also Jeremy Horder, Criminal Law and Legal Positivism, 8 Leg. Theory 221
(2002) (suggesting efforts to remove judicial discretion from criminal law are usually misguided and motivated
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The more serious objections to giving moral and emotional claims an explicit role
in the articulation and application of legal doctrine are first, that judges and juries will
fail to resolve issues and may only deepen the conflict, 52 and second, that resolutions
based on emotional and moral claims will be substantively undesirable. Put plainly, even
if it is possible to litigate these claims to a resolution in this way, we may not like the
results and may even find ourselves in worse shape.
Although these objections concern me, they do not prove that we should remain
wedded to the rationalizing goals and language of an earlier generation of criminal law
reformers. First, reasonableness tests and similar rhetorics of dispassion already provide
us with results that frustrate substantive progress, and there is some value in displaying
rather than masking the bases for these results. Should we not know the content of the
norms that will be used to judge our behavior? Second, it is far from clear that emotional
and moral arguments that would frustrate substantive reform goals will in fact win out.
Dan Kahan relates the story of a Maryland judge who gave an eighteen month work
release sentence to a man who was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter for shooting
his adulterous wife execution style while she slept. The judge explained the lenient
sentence by expressing sympathy for the defendant's plight and his approval of inflicting
"some corporal punishment" on the wife. Precisely because the judge came clean and
did not couch his action in terms of reasonableness or deterrence, newspapers, protestors
and advocacy groups, the state legislature, and even the governing body of the Maryland
judiciary weighed in with protests and substantive proposals designed to articulate and
entrench different, more progress-oriented, norms.
53
Of course, this is but one example and could easily be contested by other examples
that show the use of emotional and moral claims to support norms that many reformers
would find undesirable. 54 Norman's case, for example, served as a precedent to justify
violence by men and women. Indeed, one might compare the number of men who killed
their wives and were acquitted or convicted only of manslaughter under the common law
by unwarranted concerns about and faith in the criminal law's ability to guide behavior); cf Brain Ivan,
Legitimacy and Violence: On the Relation Between Law and Justice According to Rawls and Derrida, in Evil,
Law, and the State, supra n. 16, at 199, 207-08, arguing
a deconstructive, textual approach to law can be fruitful. Deconstruction, when conceived of as a
textual analysis, comes to stand for the practice of interpreting and reinterpreting the laws so that a
space may be opened for a new and hopefully better interpretation of these laws. It is important to
realize that this act of deconstruction is a doing, a practice that wants to make a difference that goes
beyond the merely theoretical or institutional.
If the goal is to keep a satisfactory system in operation over the long term, more sophisticated (or cynical)
observers might want to embrace moral and emotional claims in limited contexts as a safety or emergency
valve that serves, in turn, as a legitimation strategy for the entire criminal justice system. See Parry, supra n.
31, at 457-63 (discussing legitimacy and legitimation).
52. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 867 (plurality) (claiming the Supreme Court must sometimes "[call] the
contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate
rooted in the Constitution"), with id. at 995 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing Roe v.
Wade did not resolve the abortion debate but instead inflamed national politics and made them more divisive).
It probably goes without saying that my claims about appropriate argument in criminal cases fly in the face of
Rawlsian "public reason" constraints on argument to the extent they would apply to criminal law discourse.
See Kahan, supra n. 32, at 417, 478-83; Rawls, supra n. 19, at 212-54.
53. See Kahan, supra n. 32, at 490-91.
54. See id at 492-93. In the face of this possibility, Kahan urges a pragmatic strategy for deploying
emotional and moral claims. See id at 495-97.
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provocation defense or the unwritten law to the number of women who killed their
husbands or seducers and were acquitted or convicted only of manslaughter-and the
probable resulting disparity in favor of male violence may have been a factor in the
reform of provocation doctrine. That calculus requires some context, however. The
results of those cases probably reflect, albeit imperfectly, what were then the prevailing,
if not coherent, social norms. Those norms were in the process of being challenged by
reformers. Yet by choosing to drive the debate over those norms underground rather
than putting it on display, the reformers may have gained a tactical victory but lost the
larger battle. Where we end up, then, is with the realization that masking normative
conflict through "reasonableness" or "deterrence," although a progressive move in some
sense, is unlikely to deliver substantive ideals of progress, even as we recognize that
unleashing moral and emotional claims may also fail to achieve that goal-although this
move at least has the virtue of clarity.
Finally, all of these objections derive from a continued faith that progress is
possible and desirable in criminal law. Change is certain, and certain, too, is that any
change will be influenced by, and in turn will influence, the broader culture. 55 But as I
have already suggested, working for progress requires domination and elimination of
other views. To adapt Robert Cover, if law as a creation of the state is jurispathic, then
progress may be a mass murderer. 56 And it is not even clear in many cases what course
progress requires-as should be evident from my discussion of provocation. In the end,
criminal law and particularly criminal defenses are messy, open-ended, and in tension
with notions of rational, substantive progress. For that reason, they also create-again,
adapting Cover-a jurisgenerative space for the articulation and acceptance of norms
that are less under the state's control.5 7 Whether that is a good thing is a question that
links closely to one's belief in or skepticism about progress.
58
55. See Friedman, Twentieth Century, supra n. 3, at 607 (suggesting the story of American law in the
twenty-first century will be "about growth, transformation, adaptation-a story about change. More than that
is impossible to say."); supra n. 43 (discussing the relationship between legal and cultural change).
56. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L.
Rev. 4, 40, 53 (1983).
57. See id. at 11 (describing "jurisgenesis" as "the creation of legal meaning" and arguing it is a social
process that does not necessarily include the state, at least at first). I do not mean to imply that these non-state
norms are somehow the creations of free, autonomous individuals. As Cover makes clear, they are social
norms and thus are subject to the same analysis and objections as norms formally announced by the state.
What I am after is preventing a state monopoly on the articulation of binding norms (a monopoly that is one
ideal of the modem, progress-oriented state) and, even more, bringing normative conflict into the open rather
than hiding it.
58. Most criminal cases, of course, do not go to trial. Over 90% of federal criminal cases end with guilty
pleas, and the numbers are similar in most states. See Julian A. Cook, III, All Aboard! The Supreme Court,
Guilty Pleas, and the Railroading of Criminal Defendants, 75 U. Colo. L. Rev. 863, 866 (2004); Friedman,
supra n. 1, at 390-91. The prevalence of guilty pleas undermines the ability of criminal cases to serve as sites
for the display and possible provisional resolution of social conflict, and in so doing they further the
rationalization of the criminal process into another place where individuals interact with the state as a
bureaucracy that dispenses benefits and burdens and in which normative conflict is suppressed as irrational and
inefficient. See Cook, supra, at 868 (describing plea bargains as "inequitable but efficient"). At the same time,
the guilty plea underscores the majesty and primacy of the state and its processes. See U.S. v. Hyde, 520 U.S.
670, 676 (1997) (expressing concern that too lenient a standard for withdrawal of guilty pleas would "[debase]
the judicial proceeding"). In keeping with the theme of this article, the dominance of guilty pleas only
highlights the value of having the remaining criminal trials provide opportunities for displaying, participating
in, and sometimes resolving normative conflicts.
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B. Torture
I would like now to shift my discussion of justification to the law of torture.
Torture is generally considered to be a crime under international law and the laws of
most countries, including the United States. Critically, under international law-and
specifically under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("Convention")-there can be no justification, no
emergency situation that would justify its use.59  After the Senate consented to the
Convention and the President ratified it, if not before, the same would appear to be true
for the United States.
60
I want to argue that this perception of the law of torture is false. Torture, or more
properly, conduct of the kind that most people likely would consider to be torture, is
permitted in some circumstances under international law and the laws of most countries,
including the United States. The language of the Convention notwithstanding, the key
legal doctrine that enables the use of torture is justification or necessity.
Start first with the Convention. Although torture is banned absolutely, with no
possibility of justification, the Convention also takes account of a different category of
state violence: "other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." 6 1 This
category is left undefined by the Convention but is best described as bad conduct that is
"not torture." States must "undertake to prevent" it, but the "no justification" clause of
the Convention does not apply. 62  The clear implication is that violent treatment of
prisoners or others that does not rise to the level of torture can be justifiable under
international law.63 All that is left for a state that wishes to justify its violence is to play
a definitional game: whatever it may have done, it has not tortured. This is a move that
should be familiar by now, as the Bush administration and others famously have used it
to justify coercive interrogation. 64
59. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment pt.
1, art. 2, 2 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter Convention] (available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/
a39r046.htm).
60. See U.S. Department of State, Initial Report of the United States of America to the U.N. Committee
Against Torture intro. [ 6] (Oct. 15, 1999), http://niic.org/Misc/URLShell.aspx?SRC=Catalog&REFF=http://
niic.org/Library/0l 5618&ID=015618&TYPE=HTML&URL=http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/
torture toc99.html (accessed Oct. 7, 2005) ("Torture is prohibited by law throughout the United States. It is
categorically denounced as a matter of policy and as a tool of state authority.... No exceptional circumstances
may be invoked as a justification for torture.").
61. Convention, supran. 59, atpt. 1, art. 16, 1.
62. Id. (expressly applying arts. 10-13, but omitting art. 2).
63. For more complete discussions, including consideration of other international agreements, see John T.
Parry, "Just for Fun": Understanding Torture and Understanding Abu Ghraib, I J. Natl. See. L. &
Policy _ (forthcoming 2005); Parry, Escalation and Necessity, supra n. 25, at 149. Of particular importance,
the Geneva Conventions impose what appears to be an absolute ban on coercion-not just torture-for people
who fall within their coverage. See Jordan J. Paust, Post 9-11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and
Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in
Military Commissions, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1335, 1342, 1351, 1357 (2004).
64. See e.g. Memo. from Off. of Leg. Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to Pres., Re: Standards of
Conduct for Interrogation under 18 US.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Memorandum]
(engaging in extensive analysis of the distinction between torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment); Working Group Report, Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism:
Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations (Apr. 4, 2003) (same). These
documents are collected in The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L.
Dratel eds., Cambridge U. Press 2005). Even the more recent Office of Legal .counsel opinion, which
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Under international law, the term "torture" is reserved for the intentional infliction
of "severe pain or suffering." 6 5 This category may not include, for example, all forms of
beatings or isolated practices-such as wall-standing (being forced to stand spread-
eagled on one's toes with fingers on the wall above one's head, so that the body weight
is on the toes and fingers). As the European Court of Human Rights concluded, it also
does not include Britain's practice of subjecting suspected IRA members to the
combination of wall-standing for hours, hooding, continuous loud and hissing noise,
sleep deprivation, and restricted food and water.66 Because persons subjected to these
tactics often provide information, and because under the definitional game they have not
been tortured, Israel and the United States-and, one can assume, other countries-have
adopted many of these practices.
67
Turn now to domestic law. Britain practiced what we might colloquially call
torture in Northern Ireland, even if the European Court of Human Rights concluded it
was not. Similarly, France used torture in Algeria and Vietnam. 68 Were these practices
illegal as a matter of each country's domestic law? Apparently they were, yet some
combination of lawyers, policymakers, and military leaders in both countries made
plausible, rational arguments that torture-or, more frequently, forms of coercive
interrogation that they argued were something less than torture-was justifiable after the
fact or even generally legal under the circumstances.
69
Israel provides another good example. In a widely noted decision, the Supreme
Court of Israel ruled that the coercive interrogation practices used by the General
Security Service on Palestinians suspected of terrorism were illegal. Two aspects of that
supersedes the 2002 opinion and recognizes a broader definition of torture, nonetheless insists that torture is an
intentionally narrow category that must be distinguished from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. See
Memo. from Off. of Leg. Counsel, to James B. Comey, Dep. Atty. Gen., Re: Legal Standards Applicable
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, at 2, 6-10, http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf (Dec. 30, 2004). As my
discussion indicates, Israel and Britain also have made this argument. The popularity of the definitional game
also supports my point about the distinction between rhetoric and reality in the western discourse of human
rights. See supra n. 25 and accompanying text.
65. Convention, supra n. 59, at pt.1, art. 1, 1; see also Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25,
167 (1980) (holding conduct is torture only if it exhibits "particular intensity and cruelty").
66. See id. at 96, 167. For more detail on Britain's practices, see John Conroy, Unspeakable Acts,
Ordinary People: The Dynamics of Torture 4-8 (Alfred A. Knopf 2000).
67. See John T. Parry, What is Torture, Are We Doing It, and What if We Are? 64 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 237, 242,
252-53 (2003).
68. See Conroy, supra n. 66, at 31-32, 112-13 (discussing Britain); Curran, supra n. 49, at 696-97
(discussing French sources on torture in Algeria); Rita Maran, Torture: The Role of Ideology in the French-
Algerian War (Praeger 1989); Douglas Porch, The French Secret Services: From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf
War 302, 381-84 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1995).
69. For British efforts to justify torture in Northern Ireland, see Conroy, supra n. 66, at 42-43, 45-46, 188.
Many French soldiers and politicians apparently believed the torture of Algerians was justified. See Maran,
supra n. 68; Porch, supra n. 68, at 302. In addition, Vivian Curran describes the Cour de cassation's
interpretation of the crime against humanity under French law as applying only to "crimes committed 'in the
name of a State practicing a policy of ideological hegemony,"' a definition that was "deemed limited to fascist-
totalitarian states" and that was adopted to prevent analogies to French conduct in Algeria during trials of Nazis
and their French collaborators. Curran, supra n. 49, at 688 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). That is,
although contemporary French law might not allow justification of torture, it does seek to repress discussion of
France's use of it in the past. Curran also notes that in 2002, nearly five hundred retired French generals signed
a manifesto in support of the army's conduct in Algeria, and she opines that "[t]hey are among what appears to
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decision are critical. First, the Court ruled that these practices-which it was careful not
to classify as torture-were illegal because the legislature had not specifically authorized
them, not because they were categorically illegal regardless of what the legislature
thought. (And the Court's refusal to categorize these practices as torture could make it
easier for the legislature to authorize them). Second, the Court made clear that the
necessity or justification defense would be available for an official who used coercion.
In other words, even if torture is not justified in advance, it could be justifiable after the
fact, depending on the circumstances. 70  If a torturer walks free, it is hard to maintain
that torture is categorically illegal.
We now arrive at the United States, where coercive interrogation is an ongoing
issue. 71  Although there have been no cases on the issue, the necessity defense is
presumptively available to government officials prosecuted for engaging in or
authorizing torture (or other coercive techniques) for the purpose of interrogation. 72 But
U.S. law may go further. First, at least in the context of interrogation, there is no clear
and absolute individual constitutional right to be free from torture. The United States
Supreme Court has all but made clear that the self-incrimination clause is only a trial
right, with the result that it applies only to efforts to introduce coerced testimony in a
legal proceeding.73  Restrictions on coercive interrogation will thus be governed
primarily by substantive due process doctrine. As the Court has held, both the "shocks
the conscience" test and the "fundamental rights" analysis allow rights' claims to be
overcome by a sufficient government interest-that is, by a sufficient justification-and
in Chavez v. Martinez74 three justices reasonably asserted that these principles would
apply to coercive interrogation, with little effective dispute from the rest of the Court.
Thus, in cases where the government can articulate a compelling need for information
that is likely to be in the possession of a particular suspect or detainee, constitutional
doctrine supports the conclusion that such a person may have no right against being
tortured. Or, more realistically, if there were an absolute right not to be "tortured," it
70. H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817 (1999),
reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1478, 1480-86 (1999). For extensive and more celebratory analysis of Public
Committee, particularly as it contrasts with United States law, see Parry, Judicial Restraints, supra n. 25. For
discussion of Israeli interrogation practices prior to Public Committee, see Conroy, supra n. 66, at 212-14;
Parry, Judicial Restraints, supra n. 25.
71. For a discussion of torture in the United States or by United States forces that was written before the
September 11 attacks, see Conroy, supra n. 66, at 32-34, 41, 60, 68-71, 116-18. For discussion of United
States practices in the post-September 11 th "war on terror," see Parry, Escalation and Necessity, supra n. 25, at
145,154.
72. This is certainly the position of the Bush administration, at least until the public found out. See
Memorandum, supra n. 64, at 39-41; Working Group Report, supra n. 64, at 25-26. For an argument that the
necessity defense should be available in rare cases, see John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating
Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture Be An Option? 63 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 743 (2002); see also id at 745 n. 8
(collecting authorities that admit the possibility of justifying torture in rare cases).
73. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003). For analysis of this aspect of Chavez, see Carolyn J.
Frantz, Chavez v. Martinez's Constitutional Division of Labor, 2003 S. Ct. Rev. 269, and John T. Parry,
Constitutional Interpretation, Coercive Interrogation, and Civil Rights Litigation after Chavez v. Martinez, 39
Ga. L. Rev. 733 (2005).
74. 538 U.S. at 774-76 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Scalia, J.). Justices Stevens, Kennedy,
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would not extend to coercive interrogation that technically falls short of legal definitions
of torture. 
75
While this analysis has been derided by many commentators, additional arguments
also support the possibility of torture under U.S. law. Government lawyers have argued,
for example, that the Constitution's vesting of the President with the commander-in-chief
power gives him "the entire charge of hostile operations, ' 76 including the power to
interrogate enemy forces for useful information. They have also contended that the
Constitution gives the President the power "to ensure the security of [the] United States
in situations of grave and unforeseen emergencies." 77  Although I do not agree with
these arguments at such a level of generality, they are not wholly frivolous. The
Supreme Court has not definitively and specifically rejected them, and history provides a
bit of support for them. As the Department of Defense's (largely discredited) Working
Group put it, "Numerous Presidents have ordered the capture, detention, and questioning
of enemy combatants during virtually every major conflict in the Nation's
history . ,78
75. See Parry, supra n. 63. For a comprehensive argument against this kind of claim, see Seth F. Kreimer,
"Too Close to the Rack and the Screw ": Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. Pa.
J. Const. L. 278 (2003). The 2004 detention cases do not necessarily undermine this analysis, even though
those decisions may have been influenced by the Abu Ghraib "revelations." The Hamdi v. Rumsfeld plurality
stated that "indefinite detention [of citizen enemy combatants] for the purpose of interrogation is not
authorized" by any relevant federal statute, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2004), and seemed to say there is no
inherent executive emergency power to detain indefinitely, see id. at 2641-42, 2650, but it said nothing about
inherent power to detain for a limited period or about the conduct of interrogation during a limited detention
(except to the extent that such interrogation may be limited to "appropriate" actions by relevant legislation, as
was the case in Hamdi, and therefore possibly limited by the Geneva Conventions and other sources of
domestic and international law that the United States recognizes). Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
was willing in principle to recognize "an emergency power of necessity ... limited by the emergency" that
would justify unauthorized executive detention of a citizen who is "an imminent threat to the safety of the
Nation and its people"--hardly a position that categorically forbids coercive interrogation during a limited
detention. Id. at 2659 In dissent, Justice Thomas called for recognition of a broader constitutional executive
power to act in cases of emergency-a position that also does not categorically forbid coercive interrogation.
Id. at 2674-82. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, rejected an inherent emergency power to detain a
citizen indefinitely, but it is far from clear that his opinion should also be read to reject the power to detain and,
perhaps, coercively interrogate an alien. See id. at 2673 (stating his views "apply only to citizens, accused of
being enemy combatants, who are detained within the territorial jurisdiction of a federal court"). Note,
however, that Justice Stevens's dissent in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
joined, cited the government's desire "'to... find out everything [Padilla] knows so that hopefully we can stop
other terrorist attacks,"' 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2735 n. 9 (2004), and asserted Padilla's right "to a hearing on the
justification for his detention," with the further comment that "[ulnconstrained Executive detention for the
purpose of investigating and preventing subversive activity is the hallmark of the Star Chamber." Id. at 2735.
More importantly, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), which held that aliens in United States custody at
Guantanamo Bay may seek habeas corpus review of the legality of their detentions, makes clear that the
executive branch will have to provide some justification for detention. Taken together, the opinions suggest a
moderate receptiveness to claims of a limited and justified emergency power to detain and interrogate but also
signal a clear preference for congressional authorization and participation. I would argue further that, together
with Chavez, the opinions also suggest openness-albeit troubled-to coercion under limited conditions.
76. Working Group Report, supra n. 64, at 20 (quoting Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. 73, 87 (1874)).
77. Id. at 23.
78. id. at 24; see also supra n. 75 (discussing Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507). For discussions of the constitutional
status of emergency power claims, see Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises
Always Be Constitutional? 112 Yale L.J. 1011 (2003); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of
Liberalism, 98 Yale L.J. 1385 (1989); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 1257 (2004). For an excellent theoretical criticism of the Bush administration's commander-in-chief
and emergency power arguments, see Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception
and the Temptation of 9/11, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1001 (2004). For a defense of certain aspects of the Bush
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In short, international law makes room for the justification of coercive
interrogation, and domestic law-particularly in the United States-could be interpreted
to go even farther. Few would describe this legal framework as progressive or as
reflecting progress, particularly once we leave international law behind and consider the
details of U.S. law. Yet highly trained lawyers have made good faith legal arguments for
necessity exceptions and emergency power, and many law professors who have
considered the issue agree that coercion could be justifiable in specific cases. 79
With torture, we see justification claims working in two ways: as an ordinary
defense, but also as a source of state power (in which case torture becomes not a crime
but rather a legitimate state action). Using justification as a basis for state power is not
as hard a move in the United States as one might first think. Law enforcement authority,
for example, is defined constitutionally more by what the police cannot do than by what
they can. Put differently, law enforcement officials have discretion to do whatever the
Constitution does not forbid, with additional powers and limits derived from ideas about
the nature of executive authority, general statutory authorizations, common law, and the
enactment of specific criminal statutes.
80
To some extent, justification arguments for expanding executive power can be
couched in rational language, for example as reasonable, modulated, and temporary
responses to extraordinary threats.8 1 I would argue, however, that justification as a
source of state power takes a different form in popular understandings of law, power, and
criminal justice. To the extent people think of the outside world (at whatever scale) as
hostile or violent, they are more likely to approve of violent state action that transcends
the ordinary boundaries of what is legal. Thus, people in some communities are willing
to overlook, and even welcome, police violence if they believe it benefits them; the
muted popular reaction (as opposed to the academic and journalistic reaction) to Abu
Ghraib suggests a similar view with respect to the U.S. military's role in the so-called
"war on terror." 82 Critically, these views do not turn on rational weighing of costs and
administration's emergency power claims, see John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1183, 1198-1222 (2004).
79. See supra n. 72. I want to stress that not all torture is legal under this analysis, only torture that can be
justified. So, torture for fun, for humiliation, to serve as an example to others, as a form of discrimination, or
for punishment would not be justifiable under this analysis, although this distinction might not matter for
torture that was inflicted for one of these purposes and for obtaining useful information under sufficiently
compelling circumstances.
80. For a more complete version of this analysis and a comparison to the very different Israeli model, see
Parry, Judicial Restraints, supra n. 25, at 122-25. See also Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2768 (rejecting the idea that an
"officially sanctioned [detention] exceeding positive authorization to detain" is arbitrary).
81. See supra n. 75 (discussing Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507).
82. On the acceptance by some communities of police violence, see Lou Cannon, One Bad Cop, N.Y.
Times Mag. § 6, 62 (Oct. 1, 2000). See also Conroy, supra n. 66, at 111 (discussing acceptance of torture in
Argentina); id. at 136-37, 187 (discussing acceptance of torture by British media). A political cartoon on the
nomination of Alberto Gonzales for Attorney General captured the point nicely. The cartoon shows the
democratic party-represented by a donkey-asking President Bush, "Why on earth would you nominate an
attorney general who wrote the memo denigrating the Geneva Convention & endorsing torture? Won't you
risk a backlash from law-abiding Americans everywhere, rising up in moral outrage?" President Bush looks at
the donkey and thinks, "Boy, the democrats really are out of touch." Matt Davies, The Journal News
(Westchester County, N.Y.) (Nov. 13, 2004) (available at http://www.thejournalnews.com/cartoons/
davies/I I1304.html). Despite concern over government policies on torture, the Senate confirmed Gonzalez by
a vote of sixty to thirty-six, a wider margin than his predecessor, John Ashcroft, received. See Charles
Babington & Dan Eggen, Senate Confirms Gonzales, 60 to 36, Wash. Post Al (Feb. 4, 2005).
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benefits or on sustained technical analysis. They turn instead on normative stances,
based in part on prejudice but also on emotional commitments to family or community or
country (to the extent prejudice and emotional commitments can be separated at all).
Although reformers can achieve some success in managing or suppressing moral and
emotional claims in the courtroom, it is difficult to imagine how to banish these claims
from politics, particularly when they play into the hands of state officials who are more
than willing to expand their authority to use violence.
83
Plainly, this is not a substantively progressive vision, although it is progressive to
the extent that popular attitudes may provide officials with power that they will use in
rational and technocratic ways. It is also essentially the same analysis that I just used for
provocation and common law defenses, and so I may have undone here whatever
"progress" I made earlier. I will, however, make one claim in favor of this vision. If we
are to be a society that mobilizes violence against perceived threats, whether internal or
external, and if the definition of those threats turns on irrational or emotional or
prejudicial attitudes or beliefs-both of which are, I think, true to at least a significant
extent-then we should confront and display those facts. Rather than letting ourselves
believe that we are simply fighting crime or terrorism, we should realize that part of what
we are doing involves the defining and subjugation of outside groups along some
combination of national, racial, ethnic, class, and religious lines. Once again, allowing
the language of morality and emotion (and, therefore, prejudice as well) into the
discourse of justification risks-perhaps even begs-social conflict, but it also prevents
the denial and suppression of that conflict.
84
83. This intuition, of course, feeds liberal theories of political structure and judicial review that seek to
insulate categories of important substantive issues from popular control. See e.g. Eisgruber, supra n. 49, at 60-
62, 194 (arguing voters cannot be trusted with final decisions on moral issues because they tend to be
unreflective, not responsible, and ignorant); cf Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic
Politics, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 28, 42-43 (2004) (providing a general discussion of the perceived benefits of
democracy and of conceptions of what democracy is). My quarrel with such theories is less over this move in
general (although as the text makes clear, I quarrel with it to some extent), than over the claim that the resulting
institutions are "democratic," unless the goal is simply to define democracy as what we do. Cf supra n. 49 and
accompanying text.
84. Worth considering in this context are the ways we transmit knowledge about criminal law and criminal
justice, and in the process reinforce social conflicts and tensions. One way is scholarly; we read, we talk, we
theorize, we write, and in this way we construct narratives of what criminal law is, how it functions, what is
good or bad about it, and so on. These narratives, of course, embody a particular set of perspectives, quite
often the perspectives of people with little experience in the criminal justice system or, if they have experience,
it is solely as professional participants. Sometimes the voice of the criminal, the victim, the witness, or the
juror is heard, but we often have trouble fitting those voices into our scholarly and professional narratives.
Other ways to transmit this knowledge are less formal. In Profiles in Injustice, David Harris describes how
some African-American parents have "the Talk" with their children about the police and law enforcement. See
Harris, supra n. 42, at 109-14. Many white parents probably convey a different message of trust and faith in
the system to their children. Prisons may be the sites where the greatest and most accurate transmission of
knowledge about criminal justice take place. And, of course, there are thousands of other conversations in
which people of all backgrounds narrate their experiences with the criminal justice system, not to mention the
messages of popular culture. How do we incorporate these accounts into our scholarly and professional
narratives? Yet if we fail to do so, how can we consider-as Friedman properly urges us to-the social history
and sociology of crime and criminal law and the conflicts within our society? And even when we include these
voices, the possible strangeness of their narratives to scholars of legal doctrines risks exoticizing the criminal
justice experience and the people caught within it.
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IV. PROGRESS, PUNISHMENT, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
I expect that I have said enough to force some ambivalence about progress, yet
perhaps also more than enough to make readers reluctant to choose an alternative
doctrinal structure that promises social conflicts with, at best, only provisional and
partial solutions to some of those conflicts. If we broaden the focus away from doctrine
and to the criminal justice system as a whole, however, I hope to confirm that the desire
for progress is at least as problematic in criminal law as it is in the areas I touched on at
the beginning of this paper.
In the context of criminal justice, those who seek substantive progress may wish to
define it in terms of such things as elimination of the death penalty, reduction of punitive
sentences, increased treatment and rehabilitation options, and incentives for at-risk
groups to reduce behavior that is criminal or that leads to law-breaking. Yet if their
goals are to be sustainable as a workable political program, progress seekers must also
deliver reduced crime rates (and not merely promise them contingent upon a massive and
never-to-be-obtained reprioritization of social resources).
As Friedman recognizes in Crime and Punishment and other writings, figuring out
the sources of criminal behavior and addressing them can be a difficult task. 5 This
problem remains even as we experience the lowest crime rates in the past thirty years.
86
Certainly, progress-seekers can take little credit for this reduction, as it came at the same
time that spending on social welfare declined and funding for rehabilitation inside and
outside of prison remained precarious. Some of the decrease over the past decade may
simply indicate that some amount of crime is directly linked to economic conditions. In
any event, crime rates have not dropped to anything close to negligible levels, and they
could rise again. 87 Either way, we remain confronted with the problem of achieving
progress in crime prevention.
I would argue that we do in fact know one reasonably good way to prevent
crime-that is, to achieve progress in that sense. Simply put, it is the creation and
reassertion of authority and social control, by the government, private and quasi-public
associations, communities, and families. Social control can take a variety of forms, of
course. One way to achieve it is by reasserting traditional models of community
surveillance in schools, churches, and other groups-a model that many social
conservatives appear to embrace and which makes many progress-seekers queasy. 88 If
85. Friedman, supra n. 1, at 453-63; Friedman, Dead Hands, supra n. 3; Friedman, Some Remarks, supra n.
3.
86. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Violent and Property Crime Remain at Lowest Rates in 30 Years (Sept. 12,
2004) (copy on file with Tulsa Law Review); see also Dan Eggen, Violent Crime Decreased 3% Last Year, FBI
Reports, Wash. Post A2 (Oct. 26, 2004).
87. Indeed, the decrease in crime rates appears to have leveled off, and the murder rate has increased six
percent since 2000. Id. Crime rates, of course, are manipulable. The more conduct deemed criminal, the
higher crime rates will be, the more of a "crisis" we will have, and the more we will need to crack down. And,
if many low-level crimes-for example, certain drug crimes-were redefined as "not criminal" (whether or not
still illegal in some way), crime rates in the United States would plummet.
88. See Garland, Culture of Control, supra n. 22, at 99 ("Neo-conservatism introduced into political culture
a strikingly anti-modern concern for the themes of tradition, order, hierarchy, and authority.... By the 1980s,
the demand to get 'back to basics[,'] to restore 'family values' and to re-impose 'individual responsibility' had
become familiar themes on both sides of the Atlantic." (emphasis in original)).
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Friedman is correct, however, that we live in a "horizontal society," where lines of
authority in families, associations, and communities are unclear and weakened,
governments may have to do much of the work.89
David Garland has charted a different method: the movement away from
rehabilitation and toward control of prisoners and protection of the public (a move that
he calls late modem or postmodem). Control under this contemporary approach is not
about shaping criminals into citizens but rather looks back to more traditional,
hierarchical ways of exercising power through incapacitation and as an incentive for
individuals to change their behaviors. 90  The obvious problem with forms of
governmental control similar to this, especially if generalized, is that they run into
claimed liberal commitments to such things as individual rights and nondiscrimination.
Put differently, some social control strategies may achieve progress in the sense of
increased rationalization and state authority, and in terms of decreased crime rates, but
they seem to undercut the substantive rights' goals of progress. Those who do not want
this increased level of social control may have to accept, as Friedman suggests, relatively
high crime rates (or at least a structural bias in their favor) as the price we pay for what
we define as freedom, equality, and individualism in society.
9 1
Yet increased social control can take more nuanced and progressive forms.
Friedman himself has suggested "[s]tronger family services, greater economic
opportunit[ies], and improved schooling." 9 2  And, in a recent article, Christopher
Slobogin resurrects and develops the argument that criminal law should shift away from
punishing past acts and instead seek to prevent future antisocial or dangerous behavior.
Central to his argument is the claim that "a preventive regime is much better at
assimilating the proliferation of scientific findings that call into question humans' ability
to control their actions."
93
Slobogin's impressive proposal thus depends on a belief in the progressive
accumulation of scientific knowledge about human behavior and in our ability to put that
information to beneficial use-that is, to treat rather than punish people who engage in
antisocial acts, to shape better members of our communities by making them understand
the consequences of their actions, and, where possible, to restore them to society as
productive individuals. 94 Importantly, Slobogin does not extend his proposal to include
89. Friedman, supra n. 20, at 30-32; Lawrence M. Friedman, The Horizontal Society (Yale U. Press 1999).
The idea of the horizontal society also pervades Friedman's earlier Republic of Choice, supra n. 14.
90. Garland, Culture of Control, supra n. 22, at 8-20.
91. See Friedman, Dead Hands, supra n. 3, at 925; Friedman, supra n. 1, at 464; cf Garland, Culture of
Control, supra n. 22, at 128 (discussing theories that "begin from the premise that crime is a normal,
commonplace ... aspect of modem society"). At the same time, the failure of governments to impose this
level of control has played a role in the rise of the so-called "private police," with corresponding implications
for individual rights and equality norms. See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1165
(1999).
92. Friedman & Fisher, supra n. 3, at 11; see also id at 10 (discussing the role of communities, including
"community shaming"). Restorative justice theories also hold out the possibility of more nuanced approaches
to the problem of increased social control and, under some formulations, work against centralization of power
in the state. For a variety of perspectives and criticisms, see Symposium, The Utah Restorative Justice
Conference, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 1-562.
93. Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 121, 130 (2005).
94. See e.g. id at 144, 147-49.
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some of its logical possibilities. For example, he shies away from claiming that all DSM
• • • 95 ..
disorders are grounds for intervention, and he would require, as a prerequisite for
intervention, "a harmful or potentially harmful act that is both nonaccidental and
unjustified.",9 6 Finally, he does not claim that intervention or even the identification of
risky individuals should turn on heredity, although his discussion of the scientific
background for his proposal includes hereditary factors as a possible biological cause of
criminal behavior (and concern about inherited traits seems a logical consequence of a
scientifically-based preventive model).
Despite those caveats, the necessary process for achieving the goals that Slobogin
outlines is to create a therapeutic state that annexes a large proportion of what is
currently a quasi-public system of mental health assessment and treatment. Having
occupied this territory, the state will intervene in our lives-or at least in the lives of
those of us who engage in harmful or antisocial acts-with the goal of knowing and
dominating us, in order to shape and mold us in rational ways that go beyond its
traditional methods of social control. Desirable or not, such a process can only be
described as authoritarian to a degree that traditional punishment is not. In other words,
progress toward better-adjusted citizens and a safe society arguably requires progress
toward greater state authority to intervene in and control-to rationalize-our lives.
97
Because I have less faith than Slobogin in scientific discourse, particularly in the
behavioral sciences, and in its ability to assess how to treat and-a necessary corollary-
who is worth treating, I doubt the ability of preventive criminal justice to do anything
more than increase state power over us.98 But this objection may be naive. Perhaps it is
simply a matter, not so much of increasing state power, but rather of changing the ways
in which it is exercised, so that the issue is as much the quality of power as its quantity.
Indeed, Slobogin urges a move from punishment to discipline and regulation that
Foucault contended had already taken place (for the first time, at least) by the nineteenth
century.99  Slobogin's proposal is thus an excellent description of where our faith in
95. Id. at 125-26.
96. Id. at 135.
97. These criticisms are not new; they were made in the 1970s and 1980s of rehabilitative approaches to
punishment. For the classic critique, see Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal: Penal
Policy and Social Purpose 44-54 (Yale U. Press 1981). For a good review, expansion, and assessment of the
continuing validity of these claims, see Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Court
Movement, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 1205, 1219-45 (1998). Worth noting is that rehabilitative approaches are not
monolithic, and one can distinguish broadly between facilitative rehabilitation, in which prisoners choose to
participate in programs and release is not conditioned on rehabilitation, and coercive rehabilitation, in which
prisoners are forced to participate in programs and may not be released until they are deemed to be
rehabilitated. See Allen, supra, at 83 (citing Norval Morris, The Future of Imprisonment 27 (U. of Chi. Press
1974)). Slobogin's approach seems to fall on the coercive end of the continuum. See Slobogin, supra n. 93.
98. As Allen put it, in the practice of rehabilitation, "[l]ines between therapy and repression tend to fade"
and one sees "a drastic enlargement of state concerns." Allen, supra n. 97, at 46-47. For a more targeted
doctrinal and retributivist objection to the use of the criminal justice system for preventive detention, see Paul
H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 Harv. L. Rev.
1429 (2001).
99. Foucault, supra n. 5; Foucault, Society Must be Defended, supra n. 28, at 241-54. Allen's Decline of
the Rehabilitative Ideal, supra n. 97, and Garland's Culture of Control, supra n. 22, chart what is arguably a
breakdown of the disciplinary model at the government level and a return to more traditional forms of
punishment in the second half of the twentieth century. For a nice summary of research that modifies the
Foucauldian model, at least in the United Kingdom context (with application to the United States as well), to
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progress repeatedly pushes us, and of the inevitable conflicts within progressive goals as
we seek to do better at crime control.
As Slobogin points out, moreover, punishment by incarceration does a bad job
deterring criminal activity (unless the goal is simply to deter by warehousing criminals
deemed unable to function in society). 10 0 Similar insights have driven earlier efforts to
develop the preventive model. Indeed, Slobogin seems to recognize that his proposal
would revive, to a greater extent than many other preventive and rehabilitative
approaches, what Enrico Ferri called the "positive school of criminal law," which sought
"to study the natural genesis of criminality in the criminal, and in the physical and social
conditions of his life, so as to apply the most effectual remedies to the various causes of
crime." 10 1 Ferri argued that punishment does not deter and, particularly, that increasing
the severity of punishment is ineffective at fighting rising crime rates. 10 2 Against what
he saw as an irrational desire to punish, Ferri combined progressive, rational scientific
and statistical analysis with skepticism about free will. 10 3 His goal was "a moral and
preventive system, based on the natural laws of biology, psychology, and sociology."'
10 4
Achieving this goal required classifying criminals as normal or abnormal, and if
abnormal, according to whether the abnormality was "congenital or contracted, capable
or incapable of rectification."10 5 To that end, Ferri identified five classes of criminals:
moral or insane, born, habitual, occasional, and by passion. 106 Treatment or punishment
would turn less on the crime and more on the offender, in particular on which of these
categories the offender most resembled, and only the incurable would receive prolonged
confinement. Indeed, Ferri's proposals ranged far beyond criminology; he believed, for
example, that "[i]n the society of the future, the necessity for penal justice will be
reduced to the extent that social justice grows intensively and extensively."' 10 7
emphasize the decline of punishment as a public spectacle as much as the shift to discipline, see Jonathan H.
Grossman, The Art ofAlibi: English Law Courts and the Novel 7-16 (Johns Hopkins U. Press 2002).
100. Slobogin, supra n. 93, at 140-42.
101. Enrico Ferri, Criminal Sociology xvi (W.D. Morrison ed., D. Appleton & Co. 1897); see also The
Positive School of Criminology: Three Lectures by Enrico Ferri 76 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., Ernest Untermann
trans., U. Pitt. Press 1968) [hereinafter The Positive School] ("Every crime, from the smallest to the most
atrocious, is the result of the interaction of these three causes, the anthropological condition of the criminal, the
telluric environment in which he is living, and the social environment in which he is born, living, and
operating."). The version of Criminal Sociology from which I quote is a partial translation of the third edition
and the first version to appear in English. The fourth edition was published in English in 1917. See Stanley E.
Grupp, Introduction, in The Positive School, supra, at 1, 24-25 n. 19. Slobogin highlights Ferri as "perhaps the
earliest" advocate of the preventive approach. See Slobogin, supra n. 93, at 127 n. 32.
102. See Ferri, supra n. 101, at 82-110.
103. See id. at 54-63; see also The Positive School, supra n. 101, at 53-64; id at 100 (decrying "the blind
worship of punishment"). Ferri compared the classical school of criminology (represented by Cesare Beccaria)
to pre-modem medicine, although he recognized its historical importance as, "in the name of individualism and
natural rights,. . . a protest against the barbarian penalties of the Middle Ages." Id. at 99-100.
104. Ferri, supra n. 101, at 108.
105. Id. at 6-7; see also id. at 226 (stating a prisoner is a patient "more or less curable").
106. Ferri, supra n. 101, at 23-44; The Positive School, supra n. 101, at 91-93. Ferri, who was deeply
influenced by Cesare Lombroso, coined the term "born criminal." See Mary Gibson, Born to Crime: Cesare
Lombroso and the Origins of Biological Criminology 22 (Praeger 2002). In the fifth edition of Criminal
Sociology, Ferri added a sixth category: the involuntary criminal. Grupp, supra n. 101, at 23-24.
107. The Positive School, supra n. 101, at 94. Ferri proposed a long list of social, political, scientific,
administrative, and educational reforms that he claimed would reduce crime. Ferri, supra n. 101, at 114-32.
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Ferri and his fellow positivists had enormous influence on early twentieth century
criminology. 108 Despite their reformist goals, however, they are not always remembered
with affection. The founder of the positive school, Cesare Lombroso, was deeply
influenced by craniology, and Ferri endorsed its validity, although he also looked to
other scientific analysis and claimed that "the psychological study of the criminal" was
"by far the more important."'10 9 More generally, their claim that crime can have
biological causes led many positivists to endorse eugenics. 110 Many Italian positivists
also followed a political arc similar to Ferri's. Initially a socialist, by the end of his life,
Ferri was a fascist. He served on the committee that drafted Mussolini's criminal code,
which incorporated several positivist principles.Il'
I want to make clear that I am not claiming positive criminology led inexorably to
fascism (or, for that matter, to socialism) or to eugenics. Nor am I leveling similar
charges against contemporary preventive approaches. Historical context matters, and it
includes changes in the claims that science makes, as well as differences between and
changes over time in political cultures. 112 Yet we should not ignore the possibility of
historicizing preventive approaches to crime, which reveals them to be modem
phenomena that bring rational, scientific approaches to bear on the problem of crime in a
way that fits naturally with the growing authority of modem states. 113 As I argued
108. See Peter D'Agostino, Craniums, Criminals, and the 'Cursed Race': Italian Anthropology in American
Racial Thought, 1861-1924, 44 Comp. Stud. in Socy. & Hist. 319 (2002); Gibson, supra n. 106, at 247-50;
Richard F. Wetzell, Inventing the Criminal: A History of German Criminology, 1880-1945, at 31-71 (UNC
Press 2000) (discussing France as well as Germany with a focus on the influence of Lombroso's theories of
biological criminality); see also Friedman, Twentieth Century, supra n. 3, at 108-10 (discussing the influence
of hereditary theories of crime on United States law). For an example of the American reception of Ferri, see
C.R. Henderson, Book Review, 1 Am. J. Sociology 785, 787 (1896) (describing Criminal Sociology as "truly an
original scientific work" and "as distinctly a new thing as the dramas of Shakespeare were new"). The
American Institute for Criminal Law and Criminology and its Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology were
deeply influenced in their early years by the positive school. See D'Agostino, supra, at 329, 341 n. 31.
Somewhat more recently, Ferri was lauded as "a scholar of eminent stature" and "the father of modem
criminology," and the positive school was described as "so significant in today's thinking." Henry M. Muller,
Book Review, 34 Am. Sociological Rev. 979, 979 (1969). For discussion of the ongoing importance of
positivism, see Stanley Cohen, Against Criminology 4 (Transaction Bks. 1988) (arguing "[t]he whole of the
past century of criminology can be understood as a series of creative, even brilliant, yet eventually repetitive
variations on ... the positivist paradigm").
109. Ferri, supra n. 101, at 7-9; see also The Positive School, supra n. 101, at 80-85 (emphasizing the
importance of economic, social, and geographic influences).
110. D'Agostino, supra n. 108; Gibson, supra n. 106, at 236-40. Ferri believed that racial characteristics
were one of many factors that would explain differences among regions and countries in crime rates and types
of crimes. The Positive School, supra n. 101, at 78-81. For an effort to explain Ferri's racial views in light of
"the intellectual climate of the time in which he wrote," see Grupp, supra n. 101, at 4.
111. See Gibson, supra n. 106, at 234-35; Sarah Musio, La Vicenda del Codice Rocco nell'Italia
Repubblicana (The History of the Rocco Code in the Italian Republic), ch. 1, § 3, http://dexl.tsd.unifi.it/
altrodir/law-ways/musio/nav.htm?capl.htm#3 (accessed Oct. 7, 2005); Thorsten Sellin, Enrico Ferri: Pioneer
of Criminology, in The Positive School, supra n. 101, at 13, 31-32.
112. Slobogin contends, for example, that contemporary science has gotten better at assessing and predicting
behavior, and readers will not be surprised to learn that craniology is absent from his proposal. See Slobogin,
supra n. 93, at 144-50; see also Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1,6-11 (2003).
113. See Wetzell, supra n. 108, at 31 ("the late nineteenth-century birth of criminology was in many respects
a general Western European [read, modem] phenomenon"); id. at 34 (distinguishing between classical
criminology, which was concerned with protecting the individual against the state, and late nineteenth-century
criminology, which "was concerned with better protecting society against crime by extending the state's
punitive powers"--including the power to rehabilitate). For discussion of these issues in the context of
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already, a preventive approach to crime that uses science and medicine as models and
seeks to treat (and thus both regulate and discipline) criminals rather than punish them is
necessarily authoritarian in a way that traditional models of crime control are not.
Notably, moreover, this designation is independent of the question whether such
approaches would make us better off as individuals and as a society (as indeed they
might).1 14
In the ongoing task of crime control, in short, and whether we opt for traditional
forms of hierarchical power, socio-economic reform, or prevention, we are talking about
authority-usually state authority. I would like to take the argument a couple of very
speculative steps further as a way of concluding-and as a way of returning to
Friedman's work, for my speculations will be in some tension with his argument in The
Republic of Choice. In that book, Friedman explores the extent to which "the
functioning of authority and law [in western legal culture] to a large degree depends on
(or is thought to depend on) choice or consent-free, voluntary acts of those subject to
authority and law." 115 My claim here is that, for many people, the turn to social control
is a good thing and a sufficient goal by itself. I do not mean simply the return to some
set of mythical traditional values or the desire to subordinate or medicalize others. What
I mean, rather, is that a significant portion of the population of this country wants
authority, and particularly wants not just others to be subject to that authority but also to
be subject to it themselves. 116
The desire for authority-to have choice constrained or taken away-may not be a
constant and may not always have existed in the way it exists in this moment in United
States history. Its strength will vary partly in response to other cultural factors, and it
will interact and conflict with other forces. But it is also a force that shapes our culture,
including our attitudes about crime and criminal justice. Interestingly, moreover, at a
Turkey's self-conscious modernization in the early twentieth century (which included adoption of the Italian
Rocco Code), see Ruth A. Miller, Sin, Scandal, and Disaster: Politics and Crime in Contemporary Turkey, in
Evil, Law, and the State, supra n. 16, at 47, 48-52.
114. When I call the preventive approach authoritarian, I do not mean that it has no concern for individuals.
Quite the contrary; individuals are of great concern to the preventive approach (and, I would argue, concern
about the character of the individual, as a member of society, is a great concern of many authoritarian
approaches). Thus, Slobogin argues:
As modem rehabilitative efforts routinely demonstrate, a regime based on prediction does not have
to insult the notion that past choices have consequences and that the offender is responsible and held
accountable for them. There is a difference in message, however. The punishment model says to
the offender: "You have done something bad, for which you must pay." The prevention model
says: "You have done something harmful, which you must not let happen again." In terms of how
they treat their children, many parents would probably prefer the latter message to the former; ar-
guably government officials in charge of responding to antisocial behavior should as well.
Slobogin, supra n. 93, at 132-33 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). Slobogin also argues that, to the
extent any criminal law regime plays a role in shaping character, "[a]n individualized prevention
regime... would be much better [than a punishment regime] at developing good judgment." Id. at 143.
115. Friedman, supra n. 14, at 19 (emphasis omitted).
116. Cf Jean & John Comaroff, Criminal Obsessions after Foucault: Postcoloniality, Policing, and the
Metaphysics of Disorder, 30 Critical Inquiry 800, 822, 824 (2004) (arguing "there is plentiful evidence in
popular fantasy [in South Africa and elsewhere] of a nostalgia for authoritative, even authoritarian
government" and contending this phenomenon is "decidedly post-Foucaultian" because "disorder... seems to
exceed the capacity of the state to discipline and punish"); Simon, supra n. 22, at 248 ("Much of contemporary
penal innovation takes the form of a nostalgia for the trappings of a disciplinary society.").
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time of low crime rates, the desire for authority remains strong because of the perceived
threat of terrorism. Many people in this country embrace the restraints of the "war on
terror," and not just because they are afraid of something called terrorism. Authority and
control code as comfort and safety-and, therefore, a form of happiness and pleasure-
for many people much of the time. 117
Going further, I would like to stress again that progress as I have discussed it here,
and as it applies to criminal law, is not just an ideal of release and freedom but also,
simultaneously, a practice of control. Freedom cannot exist without control, and there is
no control without freedom. The ideas depend on each other for their meaning and to
exist at all as concepts. In some sense they are the same concept, a particular way of
thinking about the conditions of human existence. Progress must grapple with both
concepts, and extending one requires extending the other. So, for us to desire and even
achieve freedom, we have to experience control. Within imposed control we find
freedom from fear and anxiety and from choice and uncertainty. 1 18 Freedom without
control, even if it were possible, would be too terrifying to endure.
Although this ostensibly descriptive claim is decidedly not liberal, it is not as
foreign to contemporary strands of liberal theory as one might first expect. Stephen
Holmes, for example, stresses "the restrictive, or even anti-individualistic, element
within liberalism itself."119 Similarly, Joseph Raz recognizes that although autonomy
requires "an adequate range of choices," 120 it remains a matter of degree, and "[a]n
autonomous personality can only develop and flourish against a background of biological
and social constraints which fix some of its human needs." 12 1 Raz also recognizes that
autonomy exists in tension with government coercion, but he contends that by definition,
the coercion of the liberal state is not problematic because "its coercive measures do not
express an insult to the autonomy of individuals [as] they are motivated not by lack of
117. So far, my argument can be seen as consistent with Friedman's to the extent that I am talking about a
choice to embrace and be subject to authority. Friedman recognizes the desire of some people for authority,
and he repeatedly stresses that he is talking about a discourse of choice, so that the reality of choice may be,
and at least sometimes is, far more constrained and even inconsequential. See Friedman, supra n. 14, at 45-47,
61, 74, 128-32. For both of us, choice is not an absolute presence or absence but rather a shifting point along
the continuum between autonomy and control.
118. As a corollary, I should note my skepticism about the unadorned contention "'that there is [no] human
being who does not desire choice,"' unless that claim is made at a high level of abstraction. Sunder, supra n.
14, at 1459 (quoting Martha C. Nussbaum, Sex & Social Justice 11 (Oxford U. Press 1999)); see also id at
1459-64 (critiquing claims like Nussbaum's on grounds somewhat different from those I advance). One need
not join Lila Abu-Lughod in questioning whether "liberation [is] even a goal for which all women or people
strive." Lila Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural
Relativism and Its Others, 104 Am. Anthropologist 783, 788 (2002). It is enough to note that liberation not
only exists in relationship to control and that it is a continuum, not a simple presence or absence, but also that
the meaning of liberation and its resulting value is not fixed. Liberation and freedom mean different things in
different times and places, not just because of culture but because of differences in personal and material
circumstances and, for that matter, in the ways in which liberation presents itself in people's lives (that is,
liberation as an achievement, as a gift, as a requirement, and so on). Further, to the extent every human being
desires choice, freedom, or liberation, we might just as plausibly say that such a desire is inextricably linked
with, and cannot function without, a desire to be controlled, not to have to choose, or at least to be constrained
in one's choices and freedoms.
119. Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy ofAntiliberalism 236 (Harv. U. Press 1993).
120. Raz, supran. 18, at 373.
121. Id. at 155-56.
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respect for individual autonomy but by concern for it." 122 He goes on to insist-using
criminal law as an example-that the state should foster "valuable autonomy," 12 3 with
the result that it may restrict the autonomy of some and adopt "paternalist" measures
"which encourage the adoption of valuable ends and discourage the pursuit of base
ones."'124 Autonomy then, especially in practice, must depend on state power, and it can
exist only so long as it is directed toward approved goals that the state inevitably will
participate in defining. As Holmes puts it, "Liberty... is inextricably entwined with
authority .... 125 In short, only within the embrace of state power can we be guided
toward "valuable autonomy" and thus be truly free. My larger point in this essay,
however, is not the necessity of state power and control but rather the fact that many
people like that control, and not so much instrumentally as aesthetically and morally.
Finally, we also have to ask whether there is any option apart from control. After
all, if freedom and control are entwined, then we are not those mythical creatures called
fully autonomous, self-actualizing individuals. 126  To a significant degree, we are all
shaped, subjected to surveillance, and controlled by public and private institutions and by
our friends, neighbors, and families. We, in turn, as members of these groups, do the
same to others. Our choices, when we have them, are often about trading among the
disciplines and freedoms of market, community, and family and between those options
and the discipline, regulation, and freedom (or, sometimes, the punishments) of state
authority. Within these constraints, people discover a range of experiences and
emotions, from fulfillment to alienation, from meaning and purpose to nihilism, rage, or
ennui. 127  Sometimes we resist, and sometimes resistance makes a difference. Under
122. Id. at 157.
123. Id. at 412.
124. Id. at 423; compare supra n. 114.
125. Holmes, supra n. 119, at 204. To some extent, of course, I have merely restated a tension in
contemporary liberal theory. Liberal theorists do not agree on the scope of the state's proper power to endorse
substantive goals, but it is worth underscoring the point that one cannot be a liberal or have a liberal theory
without the state power that defines and makes that possible, so that liberalism is not only a theory of the state
but also necessarily legitimates, even if grudgingly, power and control and their use against individuals. For
related discussions, see Agamben, supra n. 27, at 121, 126-35; Buonamano, supra n. 27.
126. See Friedman, supra n. 20, at 38-39 (suggesting choice is as much a feeling as a reality, that "the
freedom to choose is almost always within certain limits, and those limits often are both unconscious and quite
restricted," and that many things we think are choices are socially determined). Remember in this context that
a preference for prevention instead of punishment likely will rest on scientific claims about the primacy of
determinism over free will and seeks to change behavior through therapeutic intervention, and those claims and
goals rest in tension with liberal ideas of autonomy. See Ferni, supra n. 101, at 54-63; Slobogin, supra n. 93, at
157-65; Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, supra n. 112, at 18-34. For more critical assessments of
this tension, see Allen, supra n. 97, at 44-46, and Boldt, supra n. 97, at 1238-45. I am not trying to argue that
lack of autonomy is either good or bad, although I would like to suggest that it is not necessarily bad (which is
itself comforting to the extent that autonomy is necessarily constrained). Raz, for example, not only recognizes
that autonomy functions in relationship to social, biological, and governmental constraints, see supra nn. 120-
24 and accompanying text, but also admits that autonomy is not required for self-realization. Raz, supra n. 18,
at 375; see also Friedman, supra n. 14, at 62 (noting the culture of choice and individualism is distinct from
libertarianism); supra n. 114 (discussing authority and individualism).
127. Compare Eyal Flowers, The Modern Self in the Labyrinth: Politics and the Entrapment Imagination 8
(Harv. U. Press 2004) (noting that "increasingly, this world offers its inhabitants either the individual response
of coping with its dehumanization, or destructive, violent eruptions in the form of riots and terror"), with Ellen
Bayuk Rosenman, Unauthorized Pleasures: Accounts of Victorian Erotic Experience 121 (Comell U. Press
2003) (discussing "pleasurable negotiations," which are "bargains made with the dominant ideology that, in
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this view-call it the authority model-law is simply a part of the larger exercise of
power. Sometimes we like how law channels power, and sometimes we do not, but in
either case our assessment is not usually very important. Power, in this model, need not
be unchanging or monolithic, and it operates in complex and sometimes conflicting
ways, all through human agency. Nor is it necessarily bad. Yet it is not dressed up in
progress as a substantive, reform project even if sometimes it seems to flow in that
direction. It does not make room for the performance or resolution of social conflict in
any transformative sense, although from time to time that might happen. Power,
authority, and control are just social facts, and what is more, many people like it that
way. But, something will lead you to say, that cannot be true.
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